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JURISDICTION 
This appeal is from the district court's September 30, 2015, Order 
~ dismissing Defendant-Appellant Mark Haik' s counterclaims, which the district 
court certified as final under Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b) on January 7, 2016. This Court 
has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code§ 78A-3-102G).1 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the district court correctly hold that Mr. Haik was barred by res 
judicata from relitigating the counterclaims? Whether a claim is barred by res 
judicata is a question of law the Court reviews for correctness. Gillmor v. Family 
Link, LLC, 2012 UT 38, if 9, 284 P.3d 622. Federal common law applies "when 
deciding if a federal court's decision has preclusive effect on a subsequent state 
V/J court proceeding." Oman v. Davis Sch. Dist. 2008 UT 70, ~ 28, n.5, 194 P.3d 956. 
This issue was preserved in Salt Lake City Corporation's motion to dismiss the 
counterclaims. (R. 3008-43). 
1 Mr. Haik cites Utah Code§ 78A-3-102(3)(e)(v), which confers jurisdiction in this 
Court over "final orders and decrees in formal adjudicative proceedings 
originating with ... the state engineer." That section is inapplicable. The order 
dismissing the counterclaims is not a "final order and decree in formal 
adjudicative proceedings." Even if the order had been on the First Cause of 
Action - the only judicial review in this case- the correct section would be 
102(3)(£), as the state engineer proceedings were informal, not formal. 
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2. Does this Court lack jurisdiction to consider Mr. Haik' s arguments 
regarding the district court's non-final denial of his motion to dismiss the 
Amended Petition for Judicial Review and Complaint? "This court is the ~ 
exclusive judge of its own jurisdiction." Powell v. Cannon, 2008 UT 19, ,r 9, 179 
P.3d 799 (internal quotation marks omitted). "The question of whether an order 
is final and appealable is a question of law." Id. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from the district court's dismissal of Mr. Haik's 
counterclaims, which seek to force Salt Lake City to provide water for 
development of Mr. Haik' s dry lots in Albion Basin. The district court dismissed 
the claims on the basis that they were or could have been litigated in two 
previous cases,2 and therefore were barred by res judicata. 
SLC filed this case against Mr. Haik and others seeking judicial review of 
the State Engineer's approval of two water right change applications. The 
. Second Cause of Action sought adjudication of the validity, nature, and priority 
of Mr. Haik's (and others') claimed water rights.3 The district court's 
2 Copies of the U.S. District Court and Tenth Circuit decisions in these two cases 
are included in the Addendum. 
3 Those water rights derive from mother right 57-7800. In Haik v. Sandy CihJ, 2011 
UT 26, 254 P.3d 171, this Court upheld a district court's decision holding Mr. 
-2-
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proceedings on the Second Cause of Action are ongoing and no appealable final 
order has been entered on the claim. 
Mr. Haik asserted five counterclaims. Mr. Haik' s counterclaims request 
the following: 
1. A declaration under Article XI, § 6 of the Utah Constitution that he is 
entitled "to water supply as authorized by Water Rights 57-10013 
(a16844) or 57-10015 (a16846) to serve homes in Albion Basin 
Subdivision." (R. 2779, if 122.) 
2. A declaration that SLC' s refusal to provide water to his lots treats 
him differently from other nearby landowners and therefore violates 
equal protection under Article I, § 24 of the Utah Constitution. 
3. 
4. 
(R. 2779-80, ,r,r 124-25.) 
A declaration that SLC's refusal to supply water to his lots violates 
his due process rights under Article I, § 7 of the Utah Constitution. 
(R. 2780, ,r,r 127.) 
A declaration "determining the validity of appropriation by the City 
as expressed in Water Right 57-10015 (a16846) or Water Right 57-
Haik and others have a superior claim to title to their respective portions of 
water right 57-7800 as against Sandy City. 
-3-
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5. 
10013 (a16844) due to an expressed intent not (1) to apply the 
appropriated water to the stated beneficial use; and (2) refusal and 
failure to supply appropriated water within a reasonable time to the , 
stated beneficial use." (R. at 2781, il 129.) 
A declaration that SLC's service of water outside of its municipal 
boundaries is subject to public regulation, presumably by the Public 
Service Commission. (R. 2781, il 132.) 
The counterclaims represent the latest chapter in what has been described 
by the Tenth Circuit as "an ongoing saga" between Mr. Haik, his father, and their 
predecessor in interest, Marvin Melville, and SLC. Haik v. Salt Lake City Corp., 
567 F. App'x 621, 623 (10th Cir. 2014) (Haik II). Forty years ago, Mr. Melville 
sued Salt Lake County challenging his inability to obtain a building permit for 
his property in the Albion Basin, located within the present day boundaries of 
the Town of Alta in Little Cottonwood Canyon, based on the Salt Lake County ~ 
Board of Health's requirement of 400 gallons of water per day, per domestic unit. 
Melville v. Salt Lake CounhJ, 570 P. 2d 687 (Utah 1977). Mr. Melville lost when this 
Court held that he had "at most" a contract right to 50 gallons per day (gpd), far 
less than the required 400 gpd. Id. at 689. 
-4-
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In 1994, Mr. Haik and his father purchased four undeveloped lots from 
Mr. Melville. Haik v. Town of Alta, No. 97-4202, 1999 WL 190717, at *1 (10th Cir. 
,.iJ Apr. 5, 1999) (Haik I). Since that time, the Hai.ks have attempted to develop their 
lots, but have been unable to do so in part because of the inadequate water 
~ supply. As a result of this inability, the Haiks sued the Town of Alta and SLC in 
1996, seeking, among other things, an order requiring SLC to provide water to 
their lots. Haik I, 1999 WL 190717. Their efforts failed. Id. The U.S. District 
Court for the District of Utah CTudge Jenkins) and the Tenth Circuit both 
recognized that SLC has no obligation to serve water ( or to allow service of 
water) to the Haiks' lots, and that its refusal to do so is a rational decision guided 
by ordinance and protection of critical watershed. Haik v. Town of Alta, No. 2:96-
cv-723J, Memorandum Opinion & Order at 20-21 (D. Utah Oct. 31, 1997), aff' d, 
Haik I, 1999 WL 190717, at *3-5. That case and the resulting decisions will be 
referred to throughout as Haik I. 
Undeterred, the Haiks again sued the Town of Alta and Salt Lake City in 
2012 seeking, among other things, the same relief- a mandate that SLC supply 
water to their Albion Basin lots. Haik II, 567 F. App'x 621. The U.S. District 
Court CTudge Stewart) and the Tenth Circuit again refused to grant the Haiks' 
requested relief, holding that neither the provisions of the Utah or United States 
-5-
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Constitutions, relevant statutes and case law, nor approved change applications 
on SLC water rights obligate SLC to supply water to the Haiks' lots. Haik II, No. 
2:12-CV-997 TS, 2013 WL 968141, at *9 (D. Utah Mar. 12, 2013), aff d, 567 F. App'x " 
621 (10th Cir. 2014). That case and the resulting decisions will be referred to 
throughout as Haik II. 
In the interim years, the Haiks continued to challenge SLC' s refusal to 
supply water to their lots through repeated interactions with SLC, Salt Lake 
County, Town of Alta, and Salt Lake County Board of Health, among others. 
Those challenges include a 2013 suit Mr. Haik brought against the Salt Lake 
County Board of Health alleging that it violated his state and federal due process 
rights in denying his renewed applications for the necessary septic permits. Haik 
v. Salt Lake County Bd. of Health, 604 F. App'x 659 (10th Cir. 2015). The Salt Lake 
County Board of Heath removed the case to federal court, and the U.S. District 
\\J· 
Court CTudge Stewart) summarily dismissed Mr. Haik' s claims. Id. at 662. On ~ 
appeal, Mr. Haik argued that the district court lacked jurisdiction because the 
removal was improper given that his complaint raised issues primarily of state 
law. Id. The Tenth Circuit disagreed, noting that "his complaint plainly seeks to 
raise issues of federal law." Id. It held that removal was nevertheless improper 
"because none of his claims present a substantial question of federal law" given 
-6-
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',:jp 
that the Tenth Circuit had utwice already affirmed district court rulings that Mr. 
Haik does not have a protected property interest in those permits so as to 
support his due process claims." Id. (emphasis in original). The Tenth Circuit 
thus remanded with instructions to the district court to remand to the state court 
~ for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 4 Id. at 663. 
As with Haik I and Haik II, the counterclaims in this case center on Mr. 
Haik' s contention that SLC has an obligation to provide him water for his Albion 
Basin lots. (R. 2756-83.) During the hearing on SLC's motion to dismiss, counsel 
for Mr. Haik conceded that the First through Third Counterclaims were raised in 
either or both Haik I and Haik II. (R. 6204-05.) Specifically, with respect to the 
First Counterclaim, he stated, "in the first Stewart decision [Haik II], yes, the 
judge ruled against us on our interpretation of Article XI, Section 6." (R. 6186.) 
When questioned as to whether the equal protection claim "under the state 
constitution [was] raised in [Haik I]," counsel for Mr. Haik responded, "yes, there 
were equal protection, disparate treatment. And these were the same facts that 
vJ 4 Mr. Haik implies that that the Tenth Circuit reversed a determination that his 
claims were barred by res judicata. (Appellant's Br. at 39.) Mr. Haik made this 
argument to the district court. (R. 3474.) As discussed above, the Tenth Circuit 
reversed and remanded precisely because Mr. Haik's federal claims were barred 
by res judicata, thereby leaving no substantial issue of federal law that would 
support removal-it did not, as Mr. Haik implies, hold that his claims were not 
barred by res judica ta. 
-7-
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were at issue." (R. 6192.) Counsel for Mr. Haik then described what Mr. Haik is 
seeking on "the first three counts": "we're seeking simply declaration of how do 
our rights and circumstances exist in this circumstance, was the Tenth Circuit " 
right, was the Tenth Circuit wrong in what's its interpretations of these state 
constitutional interests were as they apply to the facts." (R. 6194-95.) 
Following this exchange, the Court granted SLC's motion to dismiss Mr. 
Haik' s counterclaims. It explained: 
While I appreciate the clarification and, frankly, Mr. Haik, the 
candor of what we're really looking at, at least as to counts 1 
through 3, is did the Tenth Circuit get it right. I appreciate that the 
Utah Supreme Court has reserved the right to make its 
interpretations of state constructional law. It's certainly not bound 
by that. But as to parties, parties are bound by the resolutions they 
bring to finality, whether they take the fede~al track or the state 
track. 
So it may well be that your proposition as a legal proposition 
is that the Tenth Circuit got it wrong. That may well be true, but 
that's really something that res judicata assumes is that we're not 
going to get into that analysis because it's been litigated fully. 
So with respect to counts 1, 2, 3, there's a concession here that 
those specific issues were raised in the earlier federal action - in the 
Stewart action, that is the first Stewart action- and on that basis, I'm 
going to grant the motion as to those claims. (R. 6204-05.) 
The district court further granted the motion as to the Fourth and Fifth 
Counterclaims, explaining that, while they "may well not have been raised 
specifically, ... they could have been raised. They come out of the same factual 
-8-
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circumstances. And this is a case not just for issue preclusion, but claim 
preclusion." (R. 6205.) As the district court put it, uThere has to be an end." 
(R. 6205.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. 
The district court properly held that Mr. Haik is barred by res judicata 
from relitigating his counterclaims. 
Issue preclusion prevents Mr. Haik from relitigating his First through 
Fourth Counterclaims. The issues central to each of those respective 
counterclaims were decided in either Haik I or Haik II or both. In addition, the 
issue of whether two approved SLC change applications impose an obligation 
1/,j) upon SLC under Article XI, § 6 to serve water to Mr. Haik' s Albion Basin lots-
an issue that, by Mr. Haik' s own description, underlies the First through Fourth 
..;; Counterclaims-was explicitly decided in SLC' s favor in Haik II. 
Claim preclusion further applies to bar the relitigation of the counterclaims 
because the First, Second, and Third Counterclaims were admittedly asserted in 
either or both Haik I and Haik II, which involved the same parties and resulted in 
final judgments on the merits. While the Fourth and Fifth Counterclaims were 
not previously raised as such, they arise out of the same transactions that gave 
-9-
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rise to the two prior federal cases. Nothing has changed since 2012 that would 
bring the counterclaims outside the realm of claim preclusion. SLC' s assertion of 
the Second Cause of Action in this case, based on an injury to its long-held water 
rights in Little Cottonwood Creek, does not constitute a 0 new fact," nor are the 
counterclaims "new and independent claims" based on this "new fact." 
Mr. Haik's contention that the final federal court decisions in Haik I and 
Haik II can never have claim preclusive effect because they involve state law or 
state constitutional claims, is frivolous. State law claims that either were or could 
have been raised in a prior federal case cannot be litigated in a subsequent state 
court case because of claim preclusion. Issues that were previously decided by a 
federal court applying state law standards likewise cannot be litigated in a 
subsequent state court case because of issue preclusion. 
IL 
To the extent Mr. Haik seeks review of the district court's denial of his 
motion to dismiss the Amended Petition for Judicial Review and Complaint, the 
Court lacks jurisdiction. The district court has allowed SLC and the District to 
continue to prosecute their Second Cause of Action. The interlocutory order 
denying the motion to dismiss is not a final appealable order because it did not 
-10-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
resolve all claims against all parties, and does not fall within any of the 
exceptions to the final judgment rule. 
I. 
ARGUMENT 
THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY HELD THAT MR. 
HAIK IS BARRED BY RES JUDICATA FROM 
RELITIGATING HIS COUNTERCLAIMS. 
In the words of the Tenth Circuit, Mr. Haik's assertion of the counterclaims 
in this case is the latest in the" ongoing saga" between him, his father, and their 
predecessor in interest and SLC. Mr. Haik has used this case, which involves the 
question of the validity, nature, and priority of his claimed Little Cottonwood 
Creek water right, as his next forum to advance the same arguments he has been 
advancing for decades: that SLC has an obligation to serve water to his 
~ undeveloped lots in the Albion Basin, and its refusal to do so violates Mr. Haik' s 
rights. This is an issue wholly separate from the question of what, if anything, 
Mr. Haik acquired through the purported conveyance of 1/6 of mother water 
right 57-7800-the issue raised by SLC in the Second Cause of Action. It is 
further an issue that has been repeatedly decided against Mr. Haik. In light of 
this fact, the district court was correct in dismissing Mr. Haik' s counterclaims as 
barred by res judicata. 
-11-
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The doctrine of res judicata "encompasses two distinct barriers to repeat 
litigation: claim preclusion and issue preclusion." Park Lake Res. Ltd. Liab. v. U.S. 
Dep't of Agr., 378 F.3d 1132, 1135 (10th Cir. 2004).5 "[I]ssue preclusion bars a 
party from relitigating an issue once it has suffered an adverse determination on 
the issue, even if the issue arises when the party is pursuing or defending against w 
a different claim." Id. at 1136 (internal quotation marks omitted). 11 Under [claim 
preclusion], a final judgment on the merits of an action precludes the parties or 
their privies from relitigating issues that were or could have been raised in that 
action." Id. Both apply here to bar Mr. Haik from relitigating his counterclaims. 
A. The counterclaims raise the same issues that were 
decided against Mr. Haik in the prior federal cases. 
"[I]ssue preclusion bars a party from relitigating an issue once it has 
suffered an adverse determination on the issue, even if the issue arises when the 
party is pursuing or defending against a different claim." Park Lake, 378 F.3d at 
1136. Issue preclusion applies when four requirements are satisfied: 
(1) the issue previously decided is identical with the one presented 
in the action in question, (2) the prior action has been finally 
adjudicated on the merits, (3) the party against whom the doctrine is 
invoked was a party, or in privity with a party, to the prior 
5 Federal common law applies 11when deciding if a federal court's decision has 
preclusive effect on a subsequent state court proceeding." Oman v. Davis Sch. 
Dist. 2008 UT 70, ,r 28, n.5, 194 P.3d 956. 
-12-
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adjudication, and (4) the party against whom the doctrine is raised 
had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior 
action. 
~ Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Mr. Haik does not dispute that he was a party to both Haik I and Haik II. 
J Nor does he dispute that those cases resulted in judgments on the merits or that 
he had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issues raised in those cases. 
Rather, Mr. Haik argues that the issues raised in the counterclaims are different 
than those raised in Haik I and Haik II (Appellant's Br. at 48-49). This is 
inaccurate. 
The five issues raised in the counterclaims that were identical to those 
raised in either or both Haik I and Haik II are: (a) whether Utah Const. Article XI, 
§ 6 obligates SLC to supply water outside of its municipal boundary, but within 
its service area; (b) whether SLC's refusal to supply water to Mr. Haik's Albion 
~ Basin lots violates his right to equal protection; (c) whether Mr. Haik has a 
protectable property interest in receiving water from SLC; (d) whether SLC's 
approved change applications obligate it to put the water to beneficial use in the 
manner identified in the change applications; and (e) whether SLC's change 
applications impose a constitutional obligation on SLC to supply water to Mr. 
Haile' s Albion Basin lots. Each of these issues was decided in Haik I or Haik II or 
-13-
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both. Issues (a) through (d) are necessary to Mr. Haik's First through Fourth 
Counterclaims, respectively. 6 Issue (e) is the overarching issue Mr. Haik seeks to 
litigate through his counterclaims. 
1. Issues (a) through (d), which are necessary to 
Mr. Haik's First through Fourth Counterclaims, 
were previously decided against Mr. Haik. 
In his First Counterclaim, Mr. Haik requests a declaration under Article XI, 
§ 6 as to hls "entitlement to water supply as authorized by Water Rights 57-10013 
(a16844) or 57-10015 (a16846) to serve homes in Albion Basin Subdivision." 
(R. 2777, ,r 122.) This issue was decided in Haik II. The district court rejected the 
Haiks' argument that Article XI, § 6, County Water System, Inc. v. Salt Lake City, 
and Platt v. Town of Torrey, when read together, "require[e] the city to provide 
water to them, especially in light of the change applications which, if perfected, ~ 
would allow the city to do so." Haik v. Salt Lake City Corp., No. 2:12-CV-997 TS, 
6 Mr. Haik argues that the issue raised in the Fifth Counterclaim (declaratory 
relief that SLC is subject to public regulation) is not identical to any previously-
litigated issue. (Appellant's Br. at 48-49.) SLC has never claimed that it is. 
Rather, the Fifth Counterclaim is barred by claim preclusion. Further, if Mr. 
Haik is barred by issue preclusion from relitigating the issue of whether he is 
entitled to receive water from SLC, he likely lacks standing to assert his Fifth 
Counterclaim. Any alleged injury to him caused by the non-regulation of SLC's 
service of water outside of its municipal boundaries necessarily requires that Mr. 
Haik have some right to receive water from SLC. Without that right, Mr. Haik 
has no personal stake in the issue. 
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2013 WL 968141, at *9 (D. Utah Mar. 12, 2013) (unpublished), aff d, 567 F. App'x 
621 (10th Cir. 2014). It explained, "When read together, these statements do not 
require the city to provide water to Plaintiffs, they merely permit the city to do so 
and, if the city so chooses, a reasonableness requirement is imposed. Nor do 
~ these provisions stand for the proposition that the city cannot have legitimate 
reasons (such as the protection of the watershed) to decline to supply water to 
nomesidents." Id. 
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit affirmed, holding, 
Even assuming the lots are now within the city's service area, 
this fact doesn't entitle the Haiks to more water. To be sure, Article 
XI, Section 6 of the Utah Constitution mandates that a municipality 
supply water owned by it to its inhabitants at reasonable charges. 
But Article XI, Section 6 says nothing of "others beyond the limits of 
the city," and just because the Hai.ks' lots now fall within Salt Lake 
City's service area, it does not follow that the Haiks are now Salt 
Lake City inhabitants as well. 
Consistent with the Utah Constitution, Utah courts do not 
impose a duty on municipalities like Salt Lake City to supply water 
to nonresidents like the Hai.ks. 
Haik II, 567 F. App'x at 629-30 (internal citations omitted). The Tenth Circuit 
viJ further stated that it was "not persuaded that even th[e reasonableness] 
requirement [the plaintiffs advocated] applies." Id. at 630. There was no 
authority "require[ing] a municipality to have a reasonable basis for refusing to 
supply water to nomesidents in the first place." Id. 
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Mr. Haik's Second Counterclaim raises the issue of whether SLC's refusal 
to supply water to his Albion Basin lots violates his right to equal protection. 
This issue was decided in Haik I, and in Haik 11 in the specific context of the post- ~ 
Haik I facts Mr. Haik again relies on. 
In Haik I, the Haiks argued that "Salt Lake City's refusal to consent to ~ 
water service violates the Haik's right to equal protection under the law because 
it irrationally treats them differently from other similarly situated property 
owners." Haik II, Memorandum Opinion & Order at 20-21. The district court 
rejected this argument, explaining: 
Salt Lake City has no legal duty to furnish water to users outside its 
own city limits, be they "similarly situated" or not. As an owner of 
water rights, Salt Lake City's role in this instance is proprietary 
rather than administrative. The equal protection yardstick is simply 
not available to measure Salt Lake City's exercise of its contractual 
power to consent pursuant to Paragraph 8 of the Water Supply 
Agreement. 
Id. at 21-22. The Tenth Circuit affirmed under both the United States and Utah 
Constitution equal protection provisions, holding "Salt Lake City's actions were 
reasonable." Haik I, 1999 WL 190717 at *3-5. It explained, "Line-drawing 
inevitably requires that some persons who have an almost equally strong claim 
to favored treatment be placed on different sides of the lines. That the line might 
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have been drawn differently at some points is not a matter for judicial 
consideration." Id. at *5 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
The Haiks again raised an equal protection argument in Haik II. However, 
because they alleged "new facts" in support of this claim, the Tenth Circuit held 
~ that it was not barred by res judicata. Haik 2012, 567 F. App'x at 632 
("Hypothetically at least, the Haiks' new allegations could make out an equal-
protection violation where none had occurred before."). Nevertheless, it rejected 
the claim on its merits: 
[T]he Haiks have not alleged differential treatment that states a 
class-of-one equal-protection claim. We have little forgiveness for 
this since we expressly considered several things unique about the 
Haiks' situation in Haik I-including the location of their property, 
their desired use, and their limited contractual rights. The current 
complaint does not even attempt to allege facts that might lead us to 
believe that the new water recipients are similar to them in any of 
these respects. 
Id. at 632-33. 
Mr. Haik's Third Counterclaim, seeking a declaration of his due process 
rights, turns on the existence of a protectable property interest. Whether Mr. 
Haik has such a property interest was decided in Haik I and again in Haik II. 
Indeed, in Haik II, the Tenth Circuit held Mr. Haik' s due process claims were 
~ barred by issue preclusion because the protectable property interest issue had 
been decided in the previous case. Haik II, 567 F. App'x at 628-31. 
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In Haik I, the Tenth Circuit held that the Haiks' taking claim, asserted 
under both the Utah Constitution and the United States Constitution, failed 
because "they did not have a protectable interest in property that was taken or " 
damaged by Alta's denial of a building permit." 1999 WL 190717 at *7. 
Specifically, the Tenth Circuit held that "mere expectation of municipal water ~ 
service in the future is not a legal right that constitutes property subject to 
taking." Id. 
In Haik II, the Tenth Circuit held that its prior holding on the taking claim 
was sufficient to bar the Haiks' due process claims under the doctrine of issue 
preclusion. 567 F. App'x at 628-31. It nevertheless went on to consider whether 
the approval of SLC's change applications conferred upon the Haiks a 
protectable property intere·st not yet in existence at the time of the first decision. 
Id. at 629-31. The Tenth Circuit held that it did not: "The change applications 
did not alter anyone's obligations and they certainly did not give the Haiks a '-
protected property interest or 'legitimate claim of entitlement' to more water." 
Id. at 630. Mr. Haik's citation to Utah's Municipal Land Use, Development, and 
Management Act (R. 2780, il 127), has no effect on this determination, as it does 
not even purport to create protectable property interests. 
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In his Fourth Counterclaim, Mr. Haik seeks a declaration that SLC's water 
rights a16846 (57-10015) and a16844 (57-10013) are invalid in light of SLC's 
failure to put the water to the full beneficial use identified in the change 
applications-namely, its failure to provide water to the Albion Basin. Although 
~ the precise authority for such a claim is unclear/ the issue raised in the Fourth 
Counterclaim was decided in Haik II. There, the Tenth Circuit held that 
"[n]othing about [the change application] process requires the successful 
applicant to perfect or to use the water in the manner approved." 567 F. App'x at 
629. 
Each of Mr. Haik' s First through Fourth Counterclaims turns on issues that 
have previously been litigated and decided against him, in some instances twice. 
They are therefore barred by issue preclusion. (The Fifth Counterclaim, as will 
be discussed below, is barred by claim preclusion.) 
7 The Fourth Counterclaim appears to be a collateral attack on the State 
Engmeer's approval of the change applications. The only avenue to raise such a 
challenge to the approval of SLC' s change applications is a judicial review action 
pursuant to Utah Code Section 73-3-14 and Utah's Administrative Procedures 
Act. 
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2. Issue (e), the overarching issue Mr. Haik seeks 
to litigate through the counterclaims, was 
decided against Mr. Haik in Haik II. 
In addition to the above-identified issues, which are specific to the First ~ 
through Fourth individual counterclaims, there is a common issue underlying 
Mr. Haik's counterclaims: "whether Utah Constitution XI, §6 [sic], is properly 
interpreted to give property owners a constitutionally protected right to water 
when a change application is approved designating their subdivision as a 
permissible place of use of water." (R. 2757-58, ,r 9.) The change applications to 
which Mr. Haik refers are SLC's change applications a16844 and a16846. This 
issue is the overarching issue that Mr. Haik seeks to relitigate in this case. While 
not tied to a specific counterclaim, Mr. Haik is barred from doing so because it is 
the precise issue that was decided against him in Haik II. 
In that case, the Haiks "argue[ d] that the change applications," a16844 and 
al 6846, "show that water is available and should be provided to them." Haik II, 
2013 WL 968141 at *6. They further argued "that, by failing to disclose or 
intentionally withholding information about the change applications, Defendants 
engaged in all sorts of malfeasance." Id. The district court explained, "in order 
for any of Plaintiffs' claims to succeed, Plaintiffs must show that they are entitled 
to water and that Defendants have refused to provide water to which they are 
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entitled." Id. In other words, the Haiks had to show that SLC had "an 
obligation" "to supply water" to their Albion Basin lots- the same thing they 
argue in the present case. (See R. 2758, ,r 14.) 
In its Memorandum Order and Decision on the defendants' motion to 
dismiss in Haik II, the District of Utah explained, 
Unfortunately for Plaintiffs, they cannot make [the required] 
showing [that they are entitled to water] .... The city ... declined to 
provide water based on the 1963 Agreement and to further its 
interest in the protection of the watershed. 
Plaintiffs point to the change applications to rebut the reasons 
put forth by ... Salt Lake City, but Plaintiffs have failed to provide 
any allegations that the change applications entitle them to water. 
While the change applications may show some future ability for Salt Lake 
City to provide water to the Albion Basin Subdivision, there is no 
obligation to do so . ... 
Based on this simple fact, all of Plaintiffs' claims fail .... 
Haik II, 2013 WL 968141 at *6 (emphasis added). 
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. In doing so, it held that "the 
change applications did not require Salt Lake City to supply water to the Haiks." 
Haik II, 567 F. App'x at 636. "[A]t most, the approved change applications 
empowered Salt Lake City to supply water to the Haiks' lots." Id. at 629 (internal 
quotation marks omitted, emphasis added). "The city's ability to supply water" 
does not" amount[] to an obligation to do so." Id. 
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Because Mr. Haik has previously litigated the issue of whether SLC's 
change applications, which would allow SLC to serve water to his lots, impose a 
constitutional obligation on it to do so, he is barred from relitigating that issue-
which is the overarching issue in this case-here. 
B. Claim preclusion bars the re litigation of Mr. Haik' s 
counterclaims because each of those claims was raised 
or could have been raised in the two prior federal cases. 
Claim preclusion applies when three requirements are satisfied: "(1) a 
judgment on the merits in the earlier action; (2) identity of the parties or their 
privies in both suits; and (3) identity of the cause of action in both suits." Yapp v. 
Excel Corp., 186 F.3d 1222, 1226 (10th Cir. 1999). Mr. Haik does not dispute the 
first two elements- that the two prior cases resulted in judgments on the merits 
and that both he and SLC were parties to ~oth prior cases. Rather, he argues that ~ 
SLC' s filing of the present suit constitutes a change in circumstance that prevents 
application of claim preclusion (Appellant's Br. at 40-43). This argument is 
without merit. 
The Tenth Circuit "has adopted the transactional approach of the 
Restatement (Second) of Judgments in determining what constitutes identity of 
the causes of action." Yapp, 186 F.3d at 1227. Under this approach, "a claim 
arising out of the same transaction, or series of connected transactions as a 
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previous suit, which concluded in a valid and final judgment, will be precluded." 
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). "What constitutes the same transaction or 
series of transactions is to be determined pragmatically, giving weight to such 
considerations as whether the facts are related in time, space, origin, or 
~ motivation, whether they form a convenient trial unit, and whether their 
treatment as a unit conforms to the parties' expectations or business 
understanding or usage." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
In the district court, Mr. Haik conceded that his First, Second, and Third 
Counterclaims had been raised in one or more of the two prior federal cases. 
(R. 6186-95, 6204-05.) His Fourth and Fifth Counterclaims, seeking declarations 
that water rights a168558 (57-10015) and a16844 (57-10013) are invalid because 
SLC has not put the water to the beneficial use identified in the change 
applications and that SLC is subject to some public regulation, while not asserted 
vu as separate claims in the prior cases,8 arose out of the same transaction or set of 
facts. This is illustrated by the Tenth Circuit's decision in Haik II. 
8 While the Fourth Counterclaim was not previously asserted as a claim for 
declaratory relief, the argument underlying it-that SLC's water rights are 
invalid because SLC has not put the water to the full beneficial use identified in 
its change applications- was previously litigated in Haik II, as discussed below. 
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The Tenth Circuit began its decision by noting, "This appeal marks just 
one chapter in an ongoing saga over the municipal supply of water to property 
owned by Mark and Raymond Haik in Alta, Utah." Haik II, 567 F. App'x at 623. Gi 
It then briefly explained the facts giving rise to Haik I: the Haiks had "purchased 
four undeveloped lots in the Albion Basin Subdivision, located at the top of the G; 
Little Cottonwood Canyon" and "wanted to develop their lots but were unable 
to do so because of inadequate water supply." Id. When the Haiks "contacted 
Alta to arrange for water service, [they] learned that Alta has no independent 
rights to the water at issue." Id. at 624. Because the "Albion Basin Subdivision 
falls outside the 1976 [Town of Alta] limits, ... Salt Lake City's pre-approval for 
water service" is required. Id. 0 Yet when the Haiks inquired, Salt Lake City 
declined to consent to the extension of water service to their lots." Id. This led 
the Haiks to sue the Town of Alta and SLC, "asserting equal-protection claims 
against both municipalities" and challenging "Salt Lake City's refusal to consent" ~ 
to the Town of Alta serving the Albion Basin lots. Id. "The district court rejected 
the Haiks' claims on summary judgment," and the Tenth Circuit affirmed. Id. at 
624-25. 
The Tenth Circuit then addressed the "new" facts giving rise to Haik II: 
First, the Haiks based their claims on SLC change applications, which they 
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alleged "resulted in two things: (1) Salt Lake City could provide more than 400 
gallons of water per day to each of the Haiks' lots; and (2) the Albion Basin 
became part of Salt Lake City's water 'service area."' Id. at 625. Second, the 
Haiks relied on a second round of permit denials that occurred after the change 
~ applications were approved and, specifically, a letter from "Jeffry Niermeyer, the 
Director of Salt Lake City's Department of Public Utilities, [which] told 
permitting authorities that the Haiks were entitled to only 50 gallons of water per 
day under the Little Cottonwood contract." Id. Third, the Haiks relied on their 
alleged post-Haik I discovery "that Salt Lake City has been billing a number of 
homes in the Albion Basin Subdivision for water in unmetered amounts," which 
"shows that Salt Lake City is treating them differently from others within the 
Albion Basin Subdivision without reason." Id. Finally, the Haiks relied on their 
allegation "that Salt Lake City has repeatedly consented to supply water to 
"' similarly situated people in the surrounding watershed canyons," some of which 
predated Haik 1996 and some that did not. Id. 
The same operative facts from Haik I and Haik II form the basis of Mr. 
Haik's counterclaims. There is nothing new. The counterclaims stem from Mr. 
Haik' s decades-long inability to receive water for his Albion Basin lots. (R. 2760, 
,r 21; 2766, ,r,r 64-65.) Mr. Haik argues that SLC's refusal to supply water to his 
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Albion Basin lots is wrongful, just as he did in Haik I. And, as in Haik II, he relies 
on (1) SLC's change applications a16844 and a16846 (R. 2756, ilil 10-12; 2799, 
iJ 122; 2781, il if 129, 130); (2) the 50 gpd letter from Mr. Niermeyer (R. 2765, 
ilil 55-57); (3) unmetered water sales to other lots in the Albion Basin Subdivision 
(R. 2764, if 49; 2766, iJ 63); and (4) SLC's alleged new water supply agreements 
with others outside the municipal boundaries (R. 2767-68, ,r,r 67, 69-72). A 
review of Mr. Haik' s 132 factual allegations pled in support of his counterclaims 
reveals only a retread of prior facts and claims and, importantly, no facts that 
post-date the Hai.ks' 2012 Complaint or the Tenth Circuit's 2014 decision in Haik 
II. Nothing has changed that would enable Mr. Haik to assert new claims based 
on the same operative facts he has now been litigating for twenty years. 
Mr. Haik nevertheless argues that there has been a change m 
circumstances that would justify allowing him to relitigate his First, Second, and 
Third Counterclaims and to assert his Fourth and Fifth Counterclaims. In doing , 
so, he relies on SLC's assertion of the Second Cause of Action in this case, 
claiming that SLC' s allegation "of injury to [its] water rights" is a "new event" 
"that takes the counterclaims out of any preclusion." (Appellant's Br. at 41.) 
SLC's assertion of the Second Cause of Action in this case is not a "new fact" that 
would enable Mr. Haik to litigate the counterclaims. 
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Under federal res judicata law, "a new action will be permitted only where 
it raises new and independent claims, not part of the previous transaction, based on 
... new facts." Hatch v. Boulder Town Council, 471 F.3d 1142, 1150 (10th Cir. 2006) 
(emphasis in original). Here, there are no 0 new facts." SLC's assertion of a claim 
~ for the adjudication of the nature, validity, and priority of Mr. Haik's claimed 
water right is not a "new fact." Nor does SLC's assertion of that claim turn on 
any new facts. SLC' s identified injury- interference with its various Little 
Cottonwood Creek water rights-is based on facts that existed at the time of Haik 
I and Haik II, namely, SLC' s long-held water rights. Indeed, two of those water 
rights, a16844 (57-10013) and a16846 (57-10015), were the explicit basis of Mr. 
Haik' s assertion of claims in Haik II. Haik II, 567 F. App' x at 625-26. SLC' s 
assertion of the Second Cause of Action in this case merely provided Mr. Haik 
with a new forum to assert his counterclaims- it does not give rise to a new 
transaction or "new and independent claims" that previously did not exist. 
Even if SLC's assertion of the Second Cause of Action could be considered 
a "new fact," the counterclaims are nevertheless barred by claim preclusion 
because they fall within "one .of several exceptions to the rule that only claims 
related to the existing transaction are precluded." Hatch, 471 F.3d at 1150. 
Applicable here is the exception of "where ... the object of the first proceeding 
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was to establish the legality of the continuing conduct into the future." Id. at 
1151 (internal quotation marks omitted). Through both Haik I and Haik II, Mr. 
Haik sought a declaration that SLC has an obligation to serve water to his Albion ~ 
Basin lots and that its refusal to do so violates various of his constitutional rights. 
He unquestionably sought to establish the legality, or illegality, of SLC' s ~ 
"continuing conduct into the future." As this exception recognizes, allowing Mr. 
Haik to assert claims designed to obtain this same prospective relief every time 
SLC claims impairment of its long-held Little Cottonwood Creek water rights is 
antithetical to the principles of finality underlying the doctrine of res judicata. 
Because Mr. Haik' s counterclaims either admittedly were raised in one or 
both of the two prior cases or arise out of the same transaction and thus could 
have been r~ised, each of the elements of claim preclusion is satisfied. 
C. Mr. Haik' s argument that decisions of the federal courts 
can never have preclusive effect if the issue decided 
turns on state law is without merit. 
Mr. Haik additionally argues that neither issue preclusion nor claim 
preclusion can bar the relitigation of his counterclaims because res judicata does 
not apply to cases involving state law and state constitutional claims where the 
prior decision was a federal decision. (Appellant's Br. at 43-47, 47-48, 49-50.) He 
frames the question as whether "Federal courts [can] foreclose Utah State Court 
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review of Federal interpretations of ... the Utah Constitution." (Appellant's Br. 
at 43.) He also attempts to frame the same argument as a "lack of finality." 
~ (Appellant's Br. at 49.) 
In support of this argument, Mr. Haik relies upon the principle that "[t]his 
~ court, not the United States Supreme Court, has the authority and obligation to 
interpret Utah's constitutional guarantees, including the scope of due process, 
and we owe federal law no more deference in that regard than we do sister state 
interpretation of identical state language." State v. Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49, ,r 33, 
162 P.3d 1106. 
While a federal court's interpretation of a provision of the United States 
Constitution does not bind this Court in interpreting an identical provision of the 
Utah Constitution, that is not what is at issue here. Rather, the question here is 
whether a final judgment in a federal court bars the parties to that case from 
~ relitigating claims or issues that were or could have been raised and decided in 
that case, whether they be Utah constitutional claims or otherwise. The answer 
to that question is yes. 
Utah courts have repeatedly held that claim preclusion bars the relitigation 
of state law claims that have been previously litigated in federal court. See, e.g., 
McCarthy v. State, 1 Utah 2d 205, 265 P.2d 387, 389 (1953) ("The [state law] issue 
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having been squarely presented and determined [in the federal court 
proceeding], it is res judicata as between these parties."); Pride Stables v. 
Homestead Golf Club, 2003 UT App 411, ,r 18, 82 P.3d 198 (holding claim GI 
preclusion applied where "the parties fully litigated in the bankruptcy 
proceeding the issue of whether an express contract existed," a matter of Utah G;i 
law). 
Mr. Haik offers no authority to support his position that a different rule 
applies to claims under the Utah Constitution. This Court has, on at least two 
occasions, considered whether a federal court decision on claims under the Utah 
Constitution has claim preclusive effect. Nu-Med USA, Inc. v. 4Life Research, L. C., 
2008 UT 50, il 8, 190 P.3d 1264; Snyder v. Murray CihJ Corp., 2003 UT 13, ,r 36, 73 
P.3d 325. Although in both cases there was no preclusive effect, this was because 
neither federal court decision was a final decision on the merits- not because, as 
Mr. Haik contends, there is a categorical exclusion of such cases from the G, 
doctrine of claim preclusion. Nu-Med, 2008 UT 50, ,r 8 (holding claim preclusion 
did not apply because "the federal district court's voluntary dismissal was 
without prejudice"); Snyder, 2003 UT 13, ,r,r 36-37 (holding claim preclusion did 
not apply because the federal court declined to exercise supplemental 
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jurisdiction over the state constitutional claims and dismissed them without 
prejudice). 
This Court has further held that where "plaintiffs failed to assert their state 
claim [in a prior federal proceeding] when the federal court had the power to 
~ adjudicate it with their federal claim, they are barred under the doctrine of res 
judicata from litigating the issues in the instant action." Belliston v. Texaco, Inc., 
521 P.2d 397, 382 (Utah 1974). Applying this principle, the Utah Court of 
Appeals has routinely affirmed the dismissal of state claims where those claims 
could and should have been litigated in a prior federal proceeding.9 Thus, even 
though Mr. Haik did not previously assert his Fourth or Fifth Counterclaim, he is 
barred by claim preclusion from doing so here. 
9 See, e.g., Bishop v. Inwest Title Servs., Inc., 2014 UT App 189, ,r 13, 336 P.3d 578 
("Bishop could and should have asserted his claimed superior right under the 
Warranty Deed-and his claims for damages flowing from that superior right-
in conjunction with his quiet title claim against BANA and Boyce in 
the federal action. Because he failed to do so, his present claims against BANA 
and Boyce are barred by the doctrine of claim preclusion."); Hansen v. Bank of 
N. Y. Mellon, 2013 UT App 132, ,r 15, 303 P.3d 1025 ("Because we conclude that ... 
Hansen's [ state law] claims in this case could have been brought in the federal 
action, we hold that the district court correctly dismissed Hansen's claims as 
being barred by res judicata."); Massey v. Bd. of Trustees of Ogden Area Community 
Action Comm., Inc., 2004 UT App 27, ,r 12, 86 P.3d 120 ("Because Massey's 
wrongful termination claim under state law stems from the same claim as the 
section 1983 claim, Massey could and should have brought his state claims in the 
prior [federal] suit." (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted)). 
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Mr. Haik also relies on Jensen v. Cunningham, 2011 UT 17,250 P.3d 465. But 
Jensen does not extend as far as Mr. Haik would have it reach- to hold that a 
federal court's decision on a state law issue can never give rise to issue ~ 
preclusion. 
In Jensen, this Court held that the U.S. District Court's grant of summary 
judgment to the defendants on federal constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983 did not collaterally estop the plaintiffs from asserting state constitutional 
claims based on the same facts in a state court proceeding. 2011 UT 17, ,r 49. 
There, the U.S. District Court had expressly declined to exercise supplemental 
jurisdiction over the plaintiffs' state constitutional claims and dismissed them 
without making any findings with regard to those claims.10 Id. iJ 39. The grant of 
summary judgment was thus limited to analysis of the plaintiffs' federal 
constitutional claims, applying the federal framework for qualified immunity. 
This Court held that type of "federal court determination that the material G. 
undisputed facts do not give rise to a federal constitutional violation does not 
preclude a state court from deciding whether those same facts will give rise to a 
state constitutional violation." Id. iJ 49. That holding does not somehow 
establish that a federal court's decision on a state constitutional claim ( or state 
10 This is presumably the reason that claim preclusion was not raised in Jensen. 
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common law claim) is deprived of issue preclusive effect. Indeed, in Jensen, this 
Court acknowledged that where "an issue had been decided by the federal court 
using the same standard that would be applied in state court, the plaintiff [i]s 
precluded from relitigating that issue in state court." Id. ,r 42. 
Thus, while it is clear that Utah courts need not defer to a federal court's 
interpretation of the Utah Constitution or Utah law, there is no authority to 
support Mr. Haik's position that a federal court's ruling against a particular 
party on a state law issue has no preclusive effect as to that party. To the contrary, 
this Court has held that a federal court's decision on an issue of state law, 
applying state law, does, in fact, have issue preclusive effect. Jensen v. 
Redevelopment Agency of Sandy City, 951 P.2d 735, 737 (Utah 1997) ("The Tenth 
Circuit held that under Utah law plaintiffs did not have a property interest in the 
information it supplied to the City .... The Tenth Circuit's ruling that plaintiffs 
did not have any property interest in the information it disclosed to the City and 
RDA is res judicata of that issue in this action."). Haik I and Haik II involve 
precisely such decisions. 
Mr. Haik's argument that the federal court decisions in Haik I and Haik II 
cannot give rise to res judicata is frivolous. To the extent it can be read as a 
request that this Court adopt a new rule exempting from the doctrine of res 
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judicata federal court decisions in cases involving state law claims and issues, the 
Court should refuse to do so. Such a rule would erode the very purposes of the 
doctrine of res judicata - "to protect litigants from the burden of relitigating an 
identical issue with the same party or his [or her] privy and to promote judicial 
economy by preventing needless litigation," State ex rel. S.D.C., 2001 UT App 353, c;., 
,r 12, 36 P.3d 540. 
II. THE COURT LACKS JURISDICTION OVER ANY APPEAL 
OF THE DISTRICT COURT'S DENIAL OF MR. HAIK'S 
MOTION TO DISMISS. 
Although not included in his Statement of Issues, Mr. Haik has argued that 
the district court II clearly erred in failing to dismiss the suit" in response to Mr. 
Hai.k's motion to dismiss. (Appellant's Br. at 51.) He has further included in his 
Statement of Facts a discussion of SLC' s and the District's asserted injury in ~ 
support of the Second Cause of Action, concluding that the "Amended Petition 
'does not expressly allege a reasonable probability of future injury."' (Id. at 15-
19.) While less than clear, it appears that through this appeal, Mr. Haik seeks 
review of the district court's denial of his motion to dismiss. To the extent he 
does, the Court lacks jurisdiction to consider that decision. 
This Court II does not have jurisdiction over .an. appeal unless it is taken 
from a final judgment, Utah R. App. P. 3(a), or qualifies for an exception to the 
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final judgment rule." Loffredo v. Holt, 2001 UT 97, iJ 10, 37 P.3d 1070. The district 
court's denial of Mr. Hai.k's motion to dismiss is not a final judgment-it did not 
"end the controversy between the litigants," id. ,I 12, but rather allowed SLC and 
the District to continue to pursue their Second Cause of Action. 
The district court's denial of Mr. Haik' s motion to dismiss further does not 
satisfy any of the exceptions to the final judgment rule. "[O]rders and judgments 
that are not final can be appealed if such appeals are statutorily permissible, if 
the appellate court grants permission under rule 5 of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, or if the trial court expressly certifies them as final for purposes of 
appeal under rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure." Bradbury v. 
Valencia, 2000 UT 50, ,r 12, 5 P.3d 649. None of those circumstances applies here. 
To the extent Mr. Haik has sought review of the district court's denial of 
his motion to dismiss, the Court lacks jurisdiction. The Court must dismiss any 
..;; such portion of Mr. Haik's appeal and refuse to consider his arguments on SLC's 
and the District's standing to assert the Second Cause of Action and the merits of 
the claims asserted therein. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, SLC requests that this Court affirm the district 
court's dismissal of Mr. Haik's counterclaims. 
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Ii, . 
DATED this L day of October, 2016. 
nE. Draney 
Attorneys for Appellee 
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IN TIIB UNITED STA TES DISTRJCT COURT 
FOR 1HE DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DMSION 
I , I ~ 
RAYMOND A. HAIK and 
MARK C. HAIK, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
* * * * * * * * • 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
THE TOWN OF ALTA, a political subdivision ) 
of the State of Utah, and SALT LAKE CITY ) 
CORPORATION, a political subdivision of the ) 
State of Utah, ) 
Defendants. 
) 
) 
********* 
!" •• - •• ' • 
'-'I~ t t ~ • ■ I 
• • ... :. • I 
I I I:: . ·. 
Civil No. 2:96-cv-7321 
MEMORANDUM OPINION 
AND ORDER 
Plaintiffs Raymond A. Haile and Mark C. Haile ("Hailes") commenced this action to redress 
an alleged denial of equal protection of the law by the Town of Alta ("Alta"). The Hailes own 
unimproved parcels of land located within the ~bion Basin and within Alta's municipal limits. 
They contend that Alta owes a legal duty to extend municipal water service to their lots, 
notwithstanding the terms of the Water Supply Agreement between Alta and co-defendant Salt 
Lake City requiring Alta to obtain Salt Lake City's approval prior to extending additional water 
.. 
service to private landowners. Without municipal ~ter service, the Hai.ks further assert, they are 
unable to obtain the building permits required to construct dwellings on their lots. If Alta's refusal 
to extend water service is somehow sustained, the Hailes contend that they are then entitled to just 
compensation for a "taking" of their property. 
On November 27, 1996, plaintiffs filed a Motion for Partial S~ary Judgment (dkt. no. 
17). On January 22, 1997, defendan~ Al:~ an~. S-~: ... ~e City filed their memoranda Y /h 
··~ i· .. \··- l~~ ,·,,·1·-,' l :-: 1'.q, V 
,-r V '- "' .._ • ..,f 
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opposition to plaintiffs' motion (dk:t. nos. 19, 22), as well as their own cross motions for summary 
judgment (dkt. nos. 18, 21), accompanied by supporting affidavits (dlct. nos. 20, 23, 24). Alta 
also filed a motion to strike certain exhibits annexed to plaintiffs' motion papers as 
unauthenticated documents ( dkt. no. 25). The Hailes filed their response/reply memoranda on 
March 19, 1997 (dkt. nos. 31, 32, 33), and on April 9, 1997, Alta and Salt Lake City filed their 
reply memoranda ( dkt. nos. 34, 36), together with a supplement.al affidavit ( dkt no. 3 5). 
On April 25, 1997, these motions were heard by the court. At that time, the court 
requested the submission of additional data concerning water availability and took all motions 
under advisement In the weeks thereafter, the parties filed a series of papers-submission and 
objections, reply and "sur-reply" (dkt. nos. 41, 42, 43, 44, 46, 50, 52). 
Having reviewed the motions, memoranda, affidavits, submissions, objections, replies and 
sur-replies, and having considered the arguments of counsel, the court now rules as follows: 
Factual Background1 
Albion Basin is located above the Alta and Snowbird ski resorts at the top of Little · 
Cottonwood Canyon, east of Salt Lake City, and comprises part of the watershed relied upon by 
Salt Lake City and other Salt Lake Valley communities for their culinary water supply. 
In 1963, Canyonlands, Inc., an apparent predecessor in interest to plaintiffs, entered into a 
contract with the Little Cottonwood Water Company which promised the availability of not more 
than 50 gallons per day to users in each of not more than 35 cabins to be constructed in the 
Albion Basin Subdivision # 1. 
The parties' respective statements of facts recount this history in detail, supported by affidavits and 
buttressed by hundreds of pages of exhibits. The following offers only a brief swnmary of the stated facts. 
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Prior to 1971, land ownership in the Albion Basin was relatively free of county zoning 
regulations. In 1966, Salt Lake County had adopted a unifonn zoning ordinance governing 
unincorporated areas of the county, and in November 1971, the county for the first time sought to 
limit building in the Albion Basin through an amendment to the 1966 ordinance. The amendment 
provided that no dwelling could be erected on less than fifty acres of land. This amendment 
followed on the heels of applications for building permits that had been filed by Albion Basin 
Subdivision landowners who wished to construct four~plex housing units on their lots. 
Marvin and Renee Melville, together with other Albion Basin Subdivision landowners, 
challenged the amendment in district court as being arbitrazy, capricious, and unlawfully enacted. 
The first time around, the Melvilles prevailed; in 1975, the Utah Supreme Court struck down the 
1971 amendment, holding that "when a zoning regulation is to be applied to unzoned land, it must 
be done after notice has been given four times by publication and not under the guise of an 
amendment" Melville v. Salt I.Ake County, 536 P.2d 133 (Utah 1975). 
On August 4, 1975, Salt Lake County enacted another zoning ordinance, this one 
restricting construction in the Albion Basin to one single family cabin per subdivision lot. In May 
of 1976, a second trial was conducted in the Melville litigation on the plaintiffs' fourth cause of 
action seeking writs of mandamus compelling the issuance of building permits for the plaintiffs' 
proposed four-plex units. Plaintiffs did no~ prevail in the district court because they failed to 
show that any company or person, including Marvin Melville, bad the right to use sufficient water 
in Little Cottonwood Canyon to supply the 400 gallons per day per unit that was -~uired by the 
Salt Lake County Board ofHealth before a building permit could issue. On appeal, the Utah 
Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that "[a]t most plaintiffs have proved that they may have a 
~9 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
.. 
~; 
right to 50 gallons 9f water per. unit constructed, which does not meet the County Board of 
Health's requirement of 400 gallons per unit per day." Melville v. Salt Lake· County, 570 P .2d 
687,689 (Utah 1977) (~mphasis in original).2 
Meanwhile, on August 12, 1976, Salt Lake City entered into the INTERGOVERN-
1vfENTAL AGREEM:ENT-WATER SUPPLY AGREEMENTSALTLAKECITYTOALTA 
CITY ("Water Supply Agreement11). Reciting that Salt Lake City '1owns and/or controls the 
major portion of the primary waters of Little Cottonwood Canyon for the use and benefit of Salt 
Lake City residents, some of which, at this time, can be made available to Alta," the Water Supply 
Agreement provides that Salt Lake City 11agrees to make available to Alta for its use, as 
hereinafter described, the nonnal flow of raw, untreated water, not to exceed 265,000 gallons per 
day.n Id at 11. Alta's "use, as hereinafter described,11 includes the following express limitation: 
8. It is expressly understood and agreed that said pipelines shall not be 
extended to or supply water to any properties or facilities not within the present 
city limits of Alta without the prior written consent of [Salt Lake] City. 
Id at if 8. It is uncontroverted that in 1976, Albion Basin Subdivision# 1 lay beyond the city 
limits of Alta. Moreover, the Water Supply Agreement recited that nAlta recognizes [Salt Lake] 
City's need to protect its ~ershed and specifically agrees to be bound by and comply with all 
City water ordinances, applicable County ordinances, Salt Lake City-County Board of Health 
regulations and applicable state law." Id at 1 12. It also appears uncontroverted that in 1976, 
"applicable County ordinances" limited construction in the Albion Basin Subdivision # 1 to one 
:z The court also concluded that plaintiffs failed to show that they had lawfully appropriated the water 
flowing from a spring flowing from the portal of the old Alta-Helena Mine, located on Marvin Melville's Albion Basin 
property, and likewise failed to establish that they owned the spring waters as "percolating water"arising on the Melville 
property under Riordan v. Westwood, 115 Utah 215, 203 P 2d 922, 929, 930 (1949). The spring produced water at a rate 
. of 20 gallons per minute, which a health department official testified was adequate to supply the proposed·four-plexes with 
the required 400 gallons of water per unit per day. 570 P.2d at 688-89. 
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single family cabin per subdivision lot, which the Board of Health required to be supplied with 
400 gallons of water per day as a precondition to issuing a building permit 
Following the Utah Supreme Court's denial of the mandamus remedy in 1977, Marvin 
Melville made repeated requests to Salt Lake City for water to supply his Albion Basin property. 
Those requests were consistently refused, and it appears that Melville never succeeded in 
obtaining a building permit for his Albion Basin property or commencing construction of the 
proposed dwellings. 
In I 981, Alta undertook to annex the Albion Basin Subdivision, which was accomplished 
by an August 20, 1981 resolution following a July 16, 1981 public hearing.3 Thereafter, Alta 
conditioned issuance of building permits in the Albion Basin upon "approval of all uses, regardless 
of the size or number of units" given "in writing by the Salt Lak~ City-County Health Department, 
who shall certify as to the adequacy of the culinary water system and the sewage system." The 
approval of culinary water and sewer systems "shall be in accordance with the regulations of the 
Salt Lake City-County _Health Department and the Utah State Division of Health." Town of Alta 
Uniform Zoning Ordinance,§ 22-7-8(2) (1989)." The regulations referred to by the Alta 
ordinance continue to require the availability of 400 gallons of water per day per hous~g unit to 
be constructed. See Utah Admili. Code§ R309-105-1 (1.2.6) (1997) . 
.. 
In 1983, Alta requested an amendment to the Water Supply Agreement, authorizing an 
extension of water service to the newly annexed Albion Basin properties. Salt Lake City, 
Annexation was supported by, among others, Marvin Melville, See Affidavit of Mayor William H. 
Levitt, dated January 21, 1997 (dkt. no. 23), at 122. Melville now avers that he "agreed to the annexation on the belief 
that Alta would provide all city services to my property." Affidavit of Marvin Melville, dated March 5, 1997, at 15. 
Id at 126. 
-5-
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however, declined to consent to the proposed 8:ffiendment In 1988, however, Salt Lake City 
adopted a Watershed Management Plan and consented to Alta's use of water for snowmaking 
within Alta's city limits, ~hlch by 1988 included land within the Albion Basin area. 
In 1988, Alta, Salt Lake City, and other government entitle$ commenced discussion of 
acquiring private lands in the Albion Basin area for public use, and began developing acquisition 
strategies toward that end. Salt Lake City also entered into discussions with the Little 
Cottonwood Water Company in 19&8 that culminated in Salt Lake City succeeding to the 
company's obligations under various water supply contracts, including the I 963 agreement 
affecting Albion Basin Subdivision #1, following the dissolution of the company in 1994. 
In April 1991, the Salt Lake _City Council adopted a Watershed Ordinance,§ 17.04.020.~ 
B(l) of the Salt Lake city Ordinances, whic~ inter alia, prohibits the city from entering into any 
new water sales agreements or expanding any existing agreements, with three exceptions: 
(a) water sales for residential use to property owners with a spring on the property; 
(b) water sales to governmental entities for use on land they own or lease; or 
( c) water sales for snowmaking and fire protection in certain cases. 
In 1992, pursuant to the 1991 ordinance, Salt Lake City agreed to supply water to the U.S. Forest 
Service for recreational purposes at several locations, including the Albion Basin campground. In 
1993, Salt Lake City gave consent to use of additional water for snowmaking by the Alta Ski Lifts 
Company. In 1995, Salt Lake City also consented to the extension of Alta's municipal water lines 
to an expanded Alpenglow lodge facility, which purportedly falls within the 197ocity limits of 
Alta and therefore within the terms of the 1976 Water Supply Agreement 
In November, 1992, Alta prepared a General Plan ·for the Town of Alta. The General Plan 
-6-
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identifies Albion Basin as a 11high priority11 area for the acquisition by Alta of privately-owned 
lands and recommends that "no future development be allowed in areas not served by a public 
sewer system, 11 presumably including Albion Basin Subdivision# l. In September, 1994, Alta 
executed a Memorandum of Understanding with the U.S. Forest Service acknowledging that "a 
majority of the private land which exists in Albion Basin is presently undeveloped," that 
"development rights are affected by current laws and ordinances," and that "some properties lack 
water rights necessary for development," and endorsing "the public acquisition ofland in the 
Albion Basin." 
A month later, in October 1994, the Hailes stepped into this milieu by purchasing Lots 25, 
26, 29 and 30 of Albion Basin Subdivision #1 from Marvin Melville. 
In a November 29, 1994 response to Raymond Haik's written inquiry concerning water 
and sewer services, Alta informed Haik that Alta does not provide water and sewer services to the 
Albion Basin Subdivision and referred him to the Salt Lake City Department of Public Utilities, 
Water Division. Upon inquizy by the Hailes, Salt Lake City in 1996 declined to consent to the 
extension of Alta water pipes and water supply to the Hailes' lots, relying on Paragraph 8 of the 
197 6 Water Supply Agreement and the 1991 Watershed Ordinance, § 17 .04. 020 of ~e Salt Lake 
City Ordinances. 
In October, 1997, three years after their purchase, the Haiks continue to own Lots 25, 26, 
29 and 30 of Albion Basin Subdivision # 1, and continue to be unable to build on those lots 
because of the lack of culinary. water supply that remains~ legal prerequisite to tli-~ construction 
of dwellings on the property. 
-7-
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I. The Hailes' Equal Protection Claims Against Alta 
As the Ninth Circuit pointed out in Lockary v. Kayfetz, 917 F.2d 1150 (9th Cir. 1990), 
The interest in water for real estate development is not a fundamental right. Bank 
of America Nat'l Trust and Savings Ass'n v. Summer/and County Water Dist., 767 
F.2d 544, 548 (9th Cir. 1985). Unless a classification trammels fundamental 
personal rights or implicates a suspect classification, to meet constitutional 
challenge the law in question needs only some rational relation to a legitimate state 
interest. City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303-04, 96 S.Ct. 2513, 
2516-17, 49 L.Ed.2d 511 (1976) .... 
However, the rational relation test will not sustain conduct by state officials 
that is malicious, irrational or plainly arbitrary .... 
917 F.2d at 1155 (citation omitted). In this case, the Haiks contend that Alta, by refusing their 
requests to extend water service to the Hailes' Albion Basin properties, has acted in arbitrary and 
irrational fashion and has thereby denied the Hailes equal protection of the laws. The Hailes' 
contention presupposes the existence of a legal duty on the part of Alt_a to supply water to 
property owners such as the Hailes, as well as the legal and physical capacity to do so. 
A. The Municipal Duty to Supply Water. 
In Rose v. Plymouth Town, 110 Utah 358, 173 P.2d 285 (1946), the Utah Supreme Court 
held that mandamus did not lie to compel town authorities to extend their municipal water system 
to plaintiff's residence located within 1?e town's geographical limits where such extension could be 
accomplished only at considerable expense. "Unless the town authorities are shown to have failed 
to exercise judgment or discretion such that a refusal to extend the water system would be 
unreasonable their decision is final. 11 173 P .2d at 287. In dictum., Chief Justice Larson observed., 
If this were a case where the town authorities had refused to connect the ptaintiff's 
residence to a main already laid O! if the plaintiff had financed the cost of the 
extension and agreed to accept water at the prescribed rates in payment therefor, 
the remedy might lie, because the writ would then be for the purpose of compelling 
the town to perform a duty, a minist_erial act about which it would have no 
-8-
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discretion. But such i~ not this suit The effort here is to compel the extension of 
the water system a considerable distance W1der circumstances which call for reason 
and judgment and the exercise of discretion and are not ministerial. 
Id. ( emphasis added). 
Child v. City of Spanish Fork, 538 P.2d 184 (Utah 1975), rejected a claim that a 
municipality's requirement tha~ landowners in a newly annexed area convey shares of water in 
exchange for annexation was arbitrary, unreasonable, and a denial of equal protection. Agreeing 
with the district court that the requirement "represented prudence in planning for the City's 
needs, 11 the Utah Supreme Court upheld the requirement as being wholly within the city's powers 
and not "in any degree unreasonable or arbitrary," and rejected plaintiffs' assertion that the city 
should fund the acquisition of additional water through a bond issue. 538 P.2d at 186-87. 
Rejecting the new annexees' claim of unequal treatment as compared to existing residents who 
made no conveyance of water rights, the court observed that "different treatment of individuals 
does not necessarily violate th~ equal protection of the laws assurances." Persons may be treated 
differently by the law "if the classifications have a reasonable relationship to a proper and lawful 
purpose, and if all per_sons within the same class are treated equally. 11 Id at 187. The Child court 
concluded that "the treatment of all of the plaintiffs as a class seeking annexation is for a proper 
and lawfi.tl pw:pose; and ... all of the persons in that class are treated equally. 11 Id 
Similarly, Thompson v. Salt Lake City, 724 P .2d 958 (Utah 1986), involved another effort 
to compel a municipality to provide water service. By ordinance, Salt Lake City conditioned 
water service upon agreement by the landowner to be responsible for payment foi"all water 
provided to his property. Lessees sued to obtain water service where their lessor refused to sign 
such an agreement, asserting that the city had a duty to provide water service and that the 
-9-
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condition requiring landowner agreement was "arbitrary, umeasonable, and discriminatory," and 
denied equal protection of the laws. Once again the Utah Supreme Court denied relief, holding 
that although they are ~uthorized to provide water service, municipalities are not public utilities 
and do not "have a legal duty to provide water service to all members of the public .... " The 
court upheld the ordinance on the grounds that (1) the ordinance tracked a state statute 
authorizing municipalities to require property owners to be responsible for payment for water 
service (see Utah Code Ann. § l 0-7-10 (1973)); (2) the ordinance placed "all property owners in 
the same class and treat[ e~] them equally"; (3) the ordinance imposed the payment obligation on 
"the most ]ogical and reasonable persons to bear that responsibility11 .and thus represented "the 
mo.st effective means of insuring payment for water service"; and (4) the ordinance did not 
discriminate against tenants. "The ordinance therefore encompasses a legitimate purpose and 
objective and does not create an unconstitutional classification to achieve that objective." 724 
P 2d at 959, 960. 
At the outset, the Hailes acknowledge that, consistent with Thompson, Alta was not and is 
not designated as a public utility/ and "[h]ence, it does not have a legal duty to provide water 
service to all members of the public." Thompson, 724 P.2d at 959. Yet "[e]ven c:(municipality," 
the Hailes submit, "cannot arbitrarily choose to supply water to certain residents while denying it 
to others. "6 
Rose, Thompson, and Child, the Hailes assert, "make clear that a municipality may refuse 
Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, filed November 26, 1996 
( dkL no. 15) ("Pltfs' Mem. "), at 6. 
6 Reply Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, and Memorandum in 
Opposition to Defendants' Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment and D~fcndant Town of Alta's Motion to Stnlce, filed 
March 19, 1997 (dkL no. 32) ("Pltfs' Reply/Opp. Mem. (Alta)"), at 9. 
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water service to residents for .economic reasons. No such economic justification for refusing 
water service to the Haiks exists here, however." Pltfs' Reply/Opp. Mem. (Alta) at I 0. The Haiks 
urge that they remain entirely willing and able to fund the extension of water lines to their 
property, thus eliminating the kind of economic impediment that justified municipal inaction in 
. Rose, Thompson, and Child. -"[W]here the Hailes have offered to pay the costs of the extension., 
and Alta has available sufficient water," the Hailes conclude, 11Alta's obligation to provide water to 
the Haik$' lots is 'a ministerial act about which it (has] no discretion.'" Pltfs' Reply/Opp. Mem. 
(Ali.a) at 10-11 (quoting Rose, 173 P.2d at 287). 
Yet it does not follow from Rose, Thompson, or Child that economic considerations are 
the only valid reasons that may justify ~eclining to extend municipal water service to particular 
property. The Haiks' argument presupposes that "Alta has available sufficient water, 11 which in 
this case turns on considerations of legal right and the exercise of lawful power. 
While Utah law empowers municipalities to "construct, maintain and operate waterworks" 
by statute, see Utah Code Ann. § I 0-8-14 (1996), a town does not gain any entitlement to 
ownership or use of any water simply by yirtue of the town's existence. Counties, cities and 
towns have no "reserved right" to enough water to supply the needs of their constituents. Water 
to be supplied through a municipal water system must be acquired through lawful means as 
outlined in the statute. See Utah Code Ann.§ 10-7-4 (1996); Child, 538 P.2d at 186 (consistent 
with the statute, a city may acquire water resources by purchase, lease, condemnation, gift, 
assignment, "or even by prescriptive use or easement"). 
Ownership of land, without more, likewise does not entitle a private landowner to use 
water that flows across, under or nearby that land. Instead, the Legislature decreed long ago that 
- 11 -
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"[a]ll waters in this state, whether above or under the ground are hereby declared to be the 
property of the public .... 11 Utah Code Ann.§ 73-1-1 (1989). As the Utah Supreme Court 
explained in the second Melville opinion, "No one owns or can own water in this state .... One 
can only acquire the right to use the water. One's right to use the water is measured by the 
amount he puts to beneficial use without interfering with another person's prior right -to the use of 
the water.'' 570 P.2d at 688. In Utah, rights in land and rights to water arise separately and are 
legally distinct from each other. Ownership of one does not necessarily confer a right to the 
other. A municipality, like a private landowner, must acquire its water in the manner prescribed 
by law. See Mt.-Olivet Cem. Ass'n v. Salt Lake City, 65 Utah 193,235 P. 876,879 (1925) 
(neither the city's ownership ofland in Emigration Canyon nor its exercise of regulatory police 
power established proprietary right to use water). 
B. Alta's "Capacity" to Supply Water 
The waters of Little Cottonwood Canyon have been subject to extensive prior 
appropriation for years, indeed, for many years before the events concerning the Albion Basin 
transpired as recounted above. See generally Little Cottonwood Water Co. v. Sandy City, 123 
Utah 242,258 P.2d 440 (1953) (surface waters of Little Cottonwood Canyon fully appropriated; 
groundwater appropriation disputed as impairing surface water flow). Nothing in the Haiks1 
.. 
pleadings suggests that any unappropriated water remains available near Alta that Alta may now 
put to beneficial use by extending its water system to the Haik.s' Albion Basin lots.7 
Nor do th_e Haiks suggest the availability of any water that may be acquired by Alta through 
condemnation. It appears that Salt Lake City has acquired the water rights belonging to the former Little Cottonwood 
Wal.er Co.1 which otherwise might have been acquired by Alta through eminent domain proceedings. CJ North Salt Lake 
v. St. Joseph Water & Irr. Co., 118 Utah 600,223 P.2d 577 (1950) (municipality may acquire water rights by eminent 
domain from entity that provides public water service). 
- 12 -
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At this point, Salt Lake City-not Alta-appears to hold all the cards where water in Little 
Cottonwood Canyon is concerned. Indeed, as successor to the Little Cottonwood Water 
Company, Salt Lake City even has control of the water (50 gallons per day) to be supplied to 
dwellings in the Albion Basin Subdivision #1 W1der the company's 1963 agreement8 
Besides purchasing the Albion Basin lots from Marvin Melville, the Haiks stepped into 
Melville's shoes in another respect: notwithstanding the physical "availability" of sufficient water 
to support the construction of dwellings on their lots, they can establish no right under Utah's 
prior appropriation system of water rights that entitles either themselves or the Town of Alta to 
use that water for that purpose. Alta's "right" to use 265,000 gallons of water per day flows from 
its contractual agreement with that premier prior appropriator, Salt Lake City, who expressly 
conditioned Alta's right upon Salt Lake City's retained power to consent-or refuse to consent-to 
extensions of Alta's municipal water system beyond Alta's 1976 geographical limits. 
It may be true that Alta has told others that it has "the capacity to supply water for 34 
residential connections in addition to the approximately 190 connections it currently services," 
(Pltfs' Mem. at xii 1 45 ( emphasis added)), but this physical capacity does not translate into the 
legal capacity-the right or power-to authorize or support such ~e, at least outside of Alta's 
1976 geographical limits, because Alta's legal capacity to supply water remains circumscribed at 
.. 
its source, the 1976 Water Supply Agreement 
In the first instance, then, Alta cannot supply water to tlie Haiks beyond that which is 
"available" under its 1976 Water Supply Agreement with Salt Lake _City. Water is not available to 
Nothing in the present record suggests that Salt Lake City has forfeited any of its rights to water in Little 
Cottonwood Canyon for nonusc. See Nephi City v. Hansen., 779 P.2d at 673, 674-76 (Utah 1989) (city's nonconsumptive 
water rights forfeited where rights were 11unused for about thirty years"). 
- 13 -
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the Hailes under the Water Supply Agreement absent Salt Lake Citys consent to an extension of 
service beyond Alta's 19,76 limits. Where Salt Lake City withholds its consent, Alta has no legal 
right to extend water service to.the Hailes. 
II. Alta's 1981 Annexation of Albion Basin 
The Hailes cite to Utah Code Ann.§ 10-2-401(4), which states that as a matter of 
legislative policy, "areas annexed to municipalities in accordance with appropriate standards 
should receive the services pn;>Vided by the annexing municipality ... as soon as possible 
following the annexation," a1:1d to § I 0-2-417(3), whi_ch provides that municipalities "shall not 
annex territory ... without the ability and without the intent to benefit the annexed area by 
rendering munfoipal services in the annexed area." 
Paragraphs 5 and 6 of Alta's July 16, 1981 Policy Declaration referred to the intended 
availability of police and fire protection, avalanche warning, sewer dump station and planning and 
zoning services. Yet the Policy Declaration makes no express commitment to extend Alta's water 
system to the Hailes' property or to supply water notwithstanding the terms of the Water Supply 
Agreement Paragraph 7 of the Policy Declaration simply specifies that "[a]ny sewer and water 
improvements required by ~e develo,p~en~ according to the established policy of the Town," 
will be paid for by the owner or developer affected, talcing into account the possibility of future 
water availability. Affidavit of Mayor Wtlliam H. Levitt, dated January 21, 1997 (dkt no. 23), at 
~20. 
As far as § 10-2-417.(3) is concerned, this plainly was not a case of annexation solely to 
generate revenue. Anticipated revenue was minim.al. The servi_ces referred to in the Policy 
- 14-
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Declaration were provided.9 Compare Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. City of North Salt Lake, 711 P.2d 
228 (Utah 1985) (where it is uncontroverted that city annexed property solely to gain revenue 
with "no ability to render services that would benefit" the annexed property, annexation properly 
held unlawful under§ 10-2-411(3)). Sections 10-2-401 (4)_and 10-2-417(3) do not specify which 
municipal services the annexing authority must have the ability and intent to provide for a lawful 
annexation to occur; nor does the balance ofthe Local Boundary Commissions Act,§§ 10-2-401 
et seq., expressly require that water.or sewer services be furnished to all annexed property, or that 
municipalities act immediately to further the development of annexed areas. 10 
Apart from case and statutory authority, the Hailes point to no express contractual 
agreement with Alta, made either in the context of annexation or otherwise, entitling the Hailes to 
municipal water service. Instead, the Haiks assert that Alta "became obligated to provide water in 
the Albion Basin by its own statements at the time of annexation." Pltfs' Reply/Opp. Mem. (Alta) 
at I I. According to the Haiks, the Mayor of Alta spoke of doing "everything possible to 
regularize the water supply in the basin1 11 and that Alta would "try to work something out with the 
Water Department, as they actually ~ve full control over the water in the canyon." Id (quoting 
Pltfs' Exh. 11, at 2-3). "By such_ statements," the Hailes argue, "Alta convinced the property 
owners in the Albion Basin to favor annexation." Id at 12. 11 
9 In fact, Paragraph 6 of the Policy Declaration recited that "[t]hc subject area bas been serviced by the 
Town of Alta for several years by fire and police protection, avalanche warning, 911 emergency communications, library, 
and sewage disposal through the Town dump station." 
10 If anything, the Act appears to restrict development in newly annexed areas. See Utah Code Ann. § I 0-
2-418 (1996); Sweetwater Properties v. Town of Alta, 622 P 2d 1178, 1181-82 (Utah 1981). However, the parties to this 
proceeding have not briefed or argued the question whether § I 0-2-418 affected the Hane property in any way. 
II The Haiks also point to statements made when Mayor Levitt met privately with Albion Basin property 
(continued ... ) 
.. 15 .. 
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The H~ would now enforce these statements against Alta, apparently as a matter of 
promissory estoppel. 12 However, 
Utah recognizes the general rule precluding a party from asserting estoppel against 
the government Utah State University v. Sutro & Co., 646 P.2d 715, 718 (Utah 
1982). This rule safeguards the interests of the public which may be jeopardized 
by the "vagaries of political tides, frequent changes of public officials, the 
possibility of collusion, or of circumventing procedures set up by law, then suing 
for the value of goods furnished or services rendered." Id Nonetheless, we 
recognize an exception to this general rule in unusual circumstances "when it is 
plainly apparent that its application would result in injustice, and there would be no 
substantial adverse effect on pubHc policy .... " Id The critical inquiry is 11whether 
it appears that the facts may be found with such certainty, and the injustice to be 
suffered is of sufficient gravity, to invoke the exception." Id at 720. 
Prows v. State of Utah, 822 P.2d 764, 769 (Utah 1991). 
Alta's 1981 Policy Declaration may itself have some binding force, but informal statemen~ 
by the Mayor in the context of the annexation discussions do not operate as an amendment to that 
11 ( ••• continued) 
owners, promising to "do everything wssible" to allow them to build. Id. 
12 Though the Hailes' do not invoke promissory estoppel by name, the arguments presented in their 
memoranda appear to track its essential elements. As Andreason v. Aetna Casualty &Surety Co., 848 P.2d 171 (Utah a. 
App. 1993), explains: 
Promissory estoppel may be invoked in circumstances where " 'equity recognizes the unfairness of 
permitting withdrawal of the promise and will enforce iL'" Tolboe, 682 P.2d at 846 (quoting'-Union 
Tank Car Co. v. Wheat Bros., 15 Utah 2d 101,387 P .2d 1000, 1003 (1964)). The necessary clements 
of promissory estoppel include: "(l) a promise reasonably expected to induce reliance; (2) reasonable 
reliance inducing action or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third person; and (3) detrimenJ 
to the promisee or third person." Weese v. Davis County Comm'n» 834 P 2d 1, 4 n. 17 (Utah 1992) 
( ei:nphasis added). Utah has also adopted the Restatement (Second) of Contracts section 90 describing 
promissory estoppel as follows: " 'A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce 
action or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third person and which does induce such oction or 
forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise. The remedy 
granted for breach may be limited as justice requires.'" Tolboe, 682 P 2d at 845 (quoting Restatement 
(Second) Contracts§ 90(1) (1981)). 
Id at 174-75 (quoting To!boe Constr. Co. v. Staker Paving & Constr. Co., 682 P.2d 843 (Utah 1984)). "Promissory 
estoppel is historically rooted as a substitute for consideratio~ Allegheny College v. National Chautauqua County Bank, 
246 N.y. 369, 159 N.E. 173, 57 AL.R. 980, per Cardozo, C. J., citing I Williston on Contracts, Secs. 116, 139 ..•. n 
Ravarino v. Price, 123 Utah 559, 568, 260 P .2d 570, 575 (1953). 
- 16 -
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document adding water service to the services listed in Paragraph 5. "The policy declaration, 
including maps, may be amended from time to time by the governing body after at least 20 days' 
notice and public hearing." Utah Code Ann. § 10•2-414 (1996) (emphasis added). Nothing in 
the statute confers upon the Mayor the power to amend. Nor may the Mayor's "promise" be read 
into the Annexation Ordinance as a matter of "statutory construction." Pltfs' Reply/Opp. Mem. 
(Alta) at 13-14. 
The Hailes have established no express legislative or contractual duty on the part of Alta to 
supply water to Albion Basin Subdivision # 1. Alta cannot fairly be burdened with an implied legal 
duty to supply water that Alta has no legal right to use. Nor can it fairly be said that Alta has 
denied to any person the equal protection of its laws simply because it has failed to supply what it 
does not have the legal right to supply.13 
It is Salt Lake City, not Alta, that holds the right and exercises the power. 
If a duty to supply water exists, that duty must devolve upon the entity with legal right to, 
and lawful control of the water that may be physically available to the Hailes' property-Salt Lake 
City. 
III. Salt Lake City and "Prior Written Consent" to the Extension of Water Service 
The Hailes assert no duty on the part of Salt Lake City to supply water to the Albion Basin 
property; Albion Basin lies beyond the Salt Lake City limits. While the statute provides that a city 
operating a waterworks "may sell and deliver the surplus product or service capacity of any such 
13 The general duty imposed upon municipalities by Article XI. § 6 of the Utah Constitution, viz., that "all 
such waterworks, water rights, and sources of water supply oow owned or hereafter to be acquired by any municipal 
corporation, shall be preserved, maintained and operated by it for supplying its inhabitants with water at reasonable 
charges," presupposes that the water to be supplied to inhabitants has already been lawfully acquired by the municipality. 
- 17 -
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works, not required by the city or its inhabitants, to others beyond the limits of the city, 11 Utah 
Code Ann.§ 10-8-14(1), a city plainly is not required to do so.14 In fact, the Hailes concede that 
as a matter of contract, Salt Lake City may refuse consent to an extension of water service by 
Alta pursuant to the Water Supply Agreement, at least so long as such refusal is "reasonable" and 
not "arbitrary" or "capricious." 
The Hailes contend that they are entitled to test the reasonableness of Salt Lake City's 
refusal tQ consent as "taxpaying property owners of Al~" but should also be treated as ''intended 
third-party beneficiaries of the Water Supply Agreement." Reply Memorandwn in Support of 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, and Response in Opposition to Salt Lake Citys Cross-
Motion for Summary Judgment, filed March 19, 1997 (dkt. no. 31) ('1Pltfs' Reply Mem. (SLC)"),. 
at 11. They aclmowledge "the right of Salt Lake City to exert some control over uses in the 
waters he~" but deny· 1ts right to disallow 11any new residential water use, no matter bow 
environmentally soundn outside of Alta's 1976 lim.its. Id at 19. 
A. Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing 
The Haiks assert that Salt Lake City's duty reasonably to give or refuse consent flows 
from the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, citing Olympus Hills Shopping Ctr. Ltd 
v. Smith's Food and Drug Centers, Inc., 889 P .2d 445, 451 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), cert. denied, 
899 P .2d 1231 (Utah 1995). Olympus Hills recognizes that "parties who retain express power or 
14 Indeed, this provision may test the limits of Article XI, Section 6 of the Utah Constitution, which 
forbids a municipal corporation to "directly or indirectly, lease, sell, or alien or dispose of any waterworks, water rights, or 
sources of water supply now, or hereafter to be owned by it •••. " See generally Hyde Park Town v. Chambers, 99 Utah 
118, 104 P .2d 220 (1939) (agreement granting tap rights in consideration for right--of-way held void under Utah Const., 
art. XI, § 6; dicrum that "(i]f they have surplus water they may seU it within legal bounds," citing statute). 
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discretion under contract can exercise that power or discretion in such a way as to breach the 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, 11 as where a party muses its discretion for a reason outside 
of the contemplated range-a reason beyond the risks assumed by the party claiming a breach,'" or 
for a reason inconsistent with 11the justified expectations of the other party.11 Id. at 450, 451 
( quoting Steven J. Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to Perform in Good 
Faith, 94 Harv.L.Rev. 369, 385-86 (1980), and Restatement (Second) of Contracts§ 205 cmt. a 
(1981) ). However, the Haiks do not delineate how Salt Lake City bas wrongfully exercised 
power or discretion under the Water Supply Agreement, either for a reason beyond the risks that 
Alta assumed in that agreement ·or for a reason inconsistent with Alta's ''justified expectations." 
See id at 451. 
Instead, the Hailes assert that Salt Lake Citys distinction between allowing water use 
within Alta's city limits under the Water Supply Agreement and refusing consent to its use outside 
of Alta's 197 6 city limits is simply irrational. While Salt Lake City may rationally limit 
development in order to maintain and improve water quality, the Hailes concede, extending water 
and sewer service to their property would not defeat this policy, but rather would further Salt 
Lake Citys watershed protection goals. 
That the Haiks' preferred outcome may be reasonable or rational does not of necessity 
render the contrmy outcome unreasonable or irrational. Circumstances often admit more than 
one rational or reasonable result. 
That Salt Lake City would refuse consent to extensions in order to limit developmental 
"sprawl" in the Albion Basin, as Salt Lake City avers it has done, does not indicate that it has 
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wrongfully exercised power or discretion under the Water Supply Agreement, either for a reason 
beyond the risks that Alta assumed in that agreement or for a reason inconsistent with Alta's 
'Justified expectations." Restriction of Alta's expansion of water service seems to be the clear 
import of Paragraph 8. 
Paragraph 8 is phrased not in the affirmative language of grant(" Alta may extend its 
pipelines ... as approved by Salt Lake City"), but in the negative language of limitation: 
"pipelines shall not be extended to or supply water to any properties or facilities not within the 
present city limits of Alta without the prior written consent of [Salt Lake] City. 11 In essence, 
Paragraph 8 talces the extension of Alta's water pipelines beyond its 1976 limits out of the subject 
matter of the Water Supply Agreement and makes such extensions the subject of a future, 
separate agreement requiring Salt Lake City's prior assent in writing. 
The Hailes' counsel have diligently sifted the contract law books in search of a rule that 
would compel Salt Lake City to give consent under Paragraph 8 of the Water Supply Agreement, 
but they have done so to no avail The court concludes that the Hailes have failed to establish that 
Salt Lake City has breached any duty reasonably to give or refuse consent, whether under the 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, or otherwise. 
B. Equal Protection Claims Against Salt Lake City 
·~ 
'nie Hailes do not challenge the validity of Salt Lake City's 1988 Water Management Plan, 
its 1991 Watershed Ordinance, or even the 1976 Water Supply Agreement Instead they assail 
"the irrational distinction Salt Lake City has drawn between uses inside Alta's 19i6 Town limits .. 
. and uses outside" in refusing to consent to extension of water service under Paragraph 8 the 
Water Supply Agreement. Pltfs' Reply/Opp. Mero. (SLC) at 19. The Hailes contend that Salt 
-20-
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Lake City's refusal to consent to water service violates the Hailes' right to equal protection under 
the law because it irrationally treats them differently from other similarly situated property 
owners. Allowipg increased water use within the 1976 limits, the Hailes submit, threatens 
watershed degradation no less than increased water use outside those limits; where Salt Lake City 
allows one, in fairness it should allow the other, particularly where the amount of water already 
allocated for use by Alta under the 1976 Agreement would allow for such an extension. 
The Hailes have recast their contractual "reasonableness" theory in constitutional terms. 
Their argument would also appear to recast Salt Lake City in the role of a local government 
furnishing water service to "similarly situated property owners,11 and whose conduct is to be 
scrutinized using the rational basis standard. See Thompson v. Salt Lake City, 724 P.2d at 959-
60; Bank of America Nat'/ Trust v. Summer/and County, 767 F2d 544, 548 (9th Cir. 1985). 
Determining whether legislation survives rational-basis scrutiny is a two-step process. The 
first step is to identity a legitimate government purpose the enacting governmental body could 
have been pursuing. The actual motivations of the legislators are unimportant, and the decision 
makers are not required to articulate a reason for their acts. The second step of the rational-basis 
inquiry is to determine whether a rational basis exists to believe that the legislation would further 
the hypothesized purpose. Here the inquiry is whether a conceivably rational basis exists, not 
whether that basis was actually considered by the legislative body. 
As noted above, however, Salt Lake City has no legal duty to furnish water to users 
outside its own city limits, be they "similarly situated" or not As an owner of water rights, Salt 
Lake Citys role in this instance is proprietary rather than administrative. The equal protection 
yardstick is simply not available to measure Salt Lake City's exercise of its contractual power to 
032~7:i 
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consent pursuant to P~graph 8 of the Water Supply Agreement 15. 
IV. ''Taking" of the Hailes' Albion Basin Property 
Alta also moved for summary judgment on the Haiks' claim that their Albion Basin 
property has been the subject of a "taking'' without payment of just compensation.16 The Hailes 
assert that development of their Albion Basin 11was not foreclosed to the Hailes until after they had 
purchased the land in 1994," when Alta "refused to extend water or sewer to their lots in spite of 
the Haiks' willingness to pay for that extension," and consequently denied them a building permit. 
Pltfs' Reply/Opp. Mem. (Alta) at 24. "These actions, 11 the Hailes argue, "constitute a taking." Id 
Governmental land use regulation may, under extreme circmnstances, amount to a 
11 taking11 of the affected private property which entitles the property owner to just compensation 
under the United States and Utah Constituti~ns. _See, e.g., United States v. Riverside Bayview 
Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 126 (1985). To prevail on their taking claim, the Haiks must show 
that Alta's actions (1) did not substantially advance a legitimate public purpose; or (2) denied it 
economically viable use of its property. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 
1003, 1016 (1992); Nol/an v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 834 (1987). The fact 
that a regulation deprives the property owner of the most profitable use of bis property does not 
necessarily_accomplish a talcing or establish the owner's right to just compensation~ See Andrus v. 
lS Moreover, even if subject to rational basis scrutiny, Salt Lake City responds that limiting development 
outside Alta's 1976 limits was accomplished "for the very purpose of preventing development over a dispersed area, since 
dispersed development has a greater 4etrimental impact on water quality," ~us furnishing a rational oasis for the 
distinction challenged by the Hailes. Reply Memorandum in Support of Defendant Salt Lake Citys Cross Motion for 
Summary Judgment, filed April 9, 1997, at 19. While if!e Hailes dispute this rationale, they have not shown it to be 
arbitrary or capricious, or for that matter, unreasonable. 
16 The Hailes appear to make a Rule 56 cross motion on this claim for the first time in their reply 
memorandum. See Pltfs1 Reply/Opp. Mem. (Alta) at 23 n.13. 
~-
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Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 66 (1979). 
In First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 
(1987), cited by the Hailes, the county adopted an ordinance expressly forbidding construction or 
reconstruction of buildings on canyon property that had been ravaged first by fire, then by flood, 
and then designated as an "interim flood protection area." Id. at 307. The Court held that "where 
the government's activities have already worked a tal<lng of all use of property, no subsequent 
action by the government can relieve it of the duty to provide compensation for the period during 
which the ~ng was effective.11 Id. at 321 ( emphasis added). Here, Alta has adopted no express 
prohibition against building in the Albion Basin. Nor do the Hailes suggest that Alta's 
conditioning of issuance of building permits upon the availability of 400 gallons of water per day 
per unit amounts to a "taking" of all use of their property because it does not advance a legitimate 
public policy or unfairly forestalls any reasonable development Compare Del Monte Dunes at 
Monterey v. City of Monterey, 95 F.3d 1422, 1434 (9th Cir. 1996). 
In Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, the governmental entity conditioned the 
issuance of a building permit upon the landowners' strrrender of an easement to the public across 
their beach.front proirty. The Court concluded in Nollan that if the governmental entity "wants 
an easement across the Nollans' property, it must pay for it" 483 U.S. at 842. Here, Alta has 
asked to Hailes to transfer, convey, or surrender nothing. 
The Hailes still have in October of 1997 what they purchased from Marvin Melville in 
October of 1994: lots in Albion Basin Subdivision #1 with appurtenant water rights limited to 50 
gallons per day per unit under the 1963 agreement They retain the "full 'bundle' of property 
rights" they purchased. Andrus, 444 U.S. at 66. And notwithstanding the Haiks' assertion that at 
- 23 -
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the ~e of annexation, "Albion Basin property owners had a right to expect that they would be 
able to build homes on their land," Pltfs' Reply/Opp. Mem. (Alta) at 24, 17 they still lack the ''one 
'strand' of the bundle" that their predecessor in interest also did not have: a legal right to use water 
in an amount sufficient to satisfy the health department requirement of 400 gallons per day per 
unit. The Hailes cannot build on their property, not because Alta or Salt Lake City have changed 
the rules, but rather because the rules remain the same. 
The right to use real property, as part of the constitutional right to "property" protected by 
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, does not carry with it a corollary right to use water already 
put to other beneficial use by a prior appropriator. Nor does such a right obtain upon annexation 
in the form of an entitlement to "municipal services. 11 Otherwise, state and local governments in 
the arid West could conceivably be held to have 11 taken11 all lands for which no unappropriated 
water exists to be supplied through state, county or city systems. 
In Lockary v. Kayfetz, 917 F.2d 1150 (9th Cir .1990), owners of undeveloped land who 
had been refused water hookups by a local public utility district sought compensation for the 
talcing of their property because the lack of water hookups made them ineligible for county 
building permits and denied them all ~conomically viable use of their land. Reversing summary 
judgment in favor of the utility district, the Ninth Circuit observed; 
Withholding available water from land zoned exclusively for residential use 
might interfere with the landowners' reasonable investment-backed expectations by 
preventing all practical use of that land. . . . That the [plaintiffs] can still walk on, 
or ride a bike on, or look at their land does not, at this preliminary stage of the 
case, reassure us to the contrary. In this context, assuming that the [plaintiffs) 
17 The Supreme Court has suggested that where an owner is derued only some economically viable uses, a 
taking still may have occurred where government action has a sufficient economic impact and interferes with distinct 
investment-backed expectations. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019-20 n.8. 
-24-
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can show that sufficient water was available, then BCPUD's water moratorium 
may indeed constitute more than a mere reduction in property value. Cf. Trustees 
for Alaska v. E.P.A., 749 F.2d 549,560 (9th Cir. 1984) (mere reduction in 
property value does not establish a denial of all economically viable use of 
property). 
917 F.2d at 1155 (emphasis added & citation omitted). To establish a talcing of their property, 
the landowners in Lockary.were thus required to establish first that sufficient water was available 
to be furnished through the utility district hookups they requested. 
Here, it appears from the record that neither the Hailes nor the Town of Alta have 
available the water necessary to make an 11economically viable use" of the Albion Basin property 
through construction of residential dwellings. While Alta has rights under the Water Supply 
Agreement to more water than it currently uses, that water is not legally "available11 outside Alta's 
1976 limits without the consent of the proprietor, Salt Lake City. As the Ninth Circuit 
acknowledged in Lockary, if the loss of economic viability of property "is caused by something 
other than the government regulation, it does not constitute a taking." 917 F .2d at 1155 ( citing 
Bedfordv. United States, 192 U.S. 217,225 (1904)). 
On the present record, it appears that the Hailes' talcing claim also fai~ as a matter of law. 
V. Defendants' Motion to Strike Certain Exlul>its 
AJta also filed a motion to strike certain of the Hailes' ex.ht'bits11 as, i,:zter alia, not properly 
authenticated for purposes of Rule 56. Salt Lake City joined Alta's motion by footnote. See 
Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment and in Support of 
Defendant Salt Lake City's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, filed January 22, 1997 (dkt. no. 
11 Specifically, Alta objects to Exhibits 6, 16, 17, 24, 26, 27, 31. 40 and 42 to the Memorandum in 
Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
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19), at 7 n.2. 19 The Hailes respond that the challenged documents were obtained pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 63-2-102 from the defendants' own files and that there exist sufficent indicia of 
authenticity to render _the exhibits admissible even at trial. Pltfs' Reply/Opp. Mem. {Alta) at 1-8. 
-~ 
Generally, under Rule 56 the moving party must adduce admissible evidence to 
demons~te that there are no genuine issues of material fact which preclude entry of summary 
judgment, for it is clear that "only admissible evidence may be considered by the trial court in 
ruling on a motion for summary judgment II Beyene v. Coleman Security Systems Services, Inc., 
854 F.2d 1179, 1181 (9th Cir. 1988). Accord, Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106 (10th Cir. 1991); 
Jones v. Wilkinson, 800 F.2d 989, 1002 (10th Cir. 1986) ("Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 ... requires that 
material supporting a motion for summary judgment be admissible evidence"); World of Sleep, 
Inc. v. Lay-Z-Boy Chair Co., 756 F.2d 1467, 1474 (10th Cir. IQ85)("Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e), 
the court may consider only admissible evidence in ruling on a motion for summary judgment"); 
HB. Zachry Co. v. O'Brien, 378 F.2d 423,425 (10th Cir. 1967). 
A moving party may ... supplement the motion with affidavits, pleadings, 
deposition transcripts, interrogatory answers, admissions, stipulations, transcripts 
from another proceeding, oral testimony, authenticated exhibits, and anything of 
which the court may properly talce judicial notice. To be considered, the facts 
contained in these materials must be admissible or usable at trial, although for 
pwpos~ of summary judgment, the facts need not be presented to the court in a 
form admissible at trial. 
Steven Baicker-McKee, et al., Federal Civil Rules Handbook 600 (1997 ed.) (emphasis added & 
footnote omitted). 
Rule 56(e) expressly requires that summary judgment affidavits "set forth-such facts as 
19 While Salt Lake City points to plaintiffs' Exhibits 14, 17, 23, 27. and 40 as having disputed 
authenticity, Alta's motion to stn'lce did not address Exhibits 14 and 23 and arc not encompassed within Salt Lake City's 
joindcr in that motion. 
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would be admissible in evidence •... 11 The same principles apply to deposition testimony and 
other forms of evidence approved for use on summary judgment by Rule 56( c ). See Garside v. 
Osco Drug, Inc., 895 F.2d 46, 49 (1st Cir. 1990); Klein v. Trustees of Indiana University, 766 
F.2d 275, 283 (7th Cir. 1985) ("the party opposing the summary judgment motion must present 
affidavits, depositions, answers to interrogatories, or admissions which set forth disputed facts in 
a forni admissible in evidence.11) 762 F.2d 952); Clay v. Equifax, Inc., 762 F.2d 952, 956 (11th 
Cir. 1985). As the court observed in Martz v. Unio'I: Labor Life Ins. Co . ., 757 F.2d 135, 138 (7th 
Cir. 1985): "The facts must be established through one of the vehicles designed to ensure 
reliability and veracity-depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions and affidavits. When a 
party seeks to offer evidence through other exhibits, they must be identified by affidavit or 
otherwise made admissible in evidence. 6 Moore's Federal Practice P 56.11 [ 1.-8] (2d ed. 1983 ). " 
See also Singer v. Wadman, 595 F. Supp. 188,269 (D. Utah) (Wmder, J.). Only deposition 
testimony that in substance would be admissible in evidence at trial may be introduced on a 
summary judgment motion. Sldllsky v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 893 F.2d 1088, 1091 (9th Cir. 1990) 
( deposition testimony that is not based on pe;sonal knowledge and is hearsay is inadmissible and 
cannot raise a genuine issue of material fact sufficient to withstand summary judgment); Jacobsen 
v. Filler, 790 F.2d 1362, 1367 (9th Cir.1986). 
The Hailes may be correct that when examined, each of the challenged exhibits would 
prove to be authentic.20 Nevertheless, as moving parties under Rule 56, the Hai.ks are bound to 
20 However, as a general rule, newspaper articles (e.g., Exhibit 40) arc not admissible for purposes of 
summary judgment See, e.g., Horta v. Sullivan, 4 F3d 2, 8 (1st Cir. 1993} (court refused to consider hearsay newspaper 
account in exlu'bit form and asserted that "inadmiSS1°ble evidence may not be considered"); Dowdell v. Chapman, 930 
F.Supp. 533,541 (M.D. Ala. 1996) 1illon-v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 905 F.Supp. 1514, 1544 (N.D. Okla. 1995) (a 
"newspaper article is not proper evidence for submission on summary judgment as it is inadmissible bearsayj. 
-27 -
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abide by the rule's requirements concerning the admissibility of Rule 56(c) materials. For that 
reason, the defendants' motion to strike plaintiffs' Exhibits 6, 16, 17, 24, 26, 27, 31, 40 and 42 
should be granted.21 
Conclusion 
Toe Haiks have failed to show that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law that 
the Town of Alta, by declining to extend its water service to the Haiks' Albion Basin property, has 
denied thym equal protection of the laws, or breached any other asserted statutory or contractual 
duty'to furnish culinary water. The Hailes likewise have failed to establish a breach of any 
contractual or other legal duty on the part of Salt Lake City to approve the extension of Alta's 
water lines to serve the Hailes' property. The parties having established the absence of any 
genuine issue of material fact, it now appears that the Town of Alta and Salt Lake City are each 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the Haiks' pleaded claims. Therefore, 
IT IS ORDERED that plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment is DENIED; that 
defendant Town of alta's motion for summary judgment is GRANTED; that the Town of Alta's 
motion to strike is GRANTED; and that Salt Lake City's motion for summary judgment is 
20( ••• continued) 
21 The1Haiks requested a continuance should "the Court determine□ that the challenged exhibits must be 
struck, and that without them it must deny the plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment." Pltfs' Reply/Opp. Mem. (Alta) 
at 8. It appears, however, that the exhibits in question·are not material to the issues that the Court has determined to be 
dispositive, and a continuance to pennit authentication of the exhibits appears unnecessary. 
-28 -
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i• 
GRANTED, and plaintiffs' complaint shall be and hereby is DIS:MISSED. 
DATED this ..1L day of October, 1997. 
BY TIIE COURT: 
-29-
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United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit. 
Raymond A HAIK; Mark C. 
Haik, Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
V. 
TOWN of Alta, a political subdivision 
of the State of Utah; Salt Lake City 
Corporation, a political subdivision of 
the State of Utah, Defendants-Appellees. 
No. 97-4202. 
I 
April 5, 1999. 
(D.C. No. 96-CV-732-J)(Dist. of Utah) 
Before BRISCOE, BARRETT, and MURPHY Circuit 
Judges. 
* ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
*1 Raymond A. Haik and Mark C. Haik (the Haiks) 
appeal the district court's grant of summary judgment in 
favor of defendants, the Town of Alta (Alta) and Salt 
Lake City Corporation (Salt Lake City) on their equal 
protection and taking claims. 
Background 
In October, 1994, the Haiks purchased lots 25, 26, 29, 
and 30, of the Albion Basin Subdivision # 1 (Albion 
Basin) located above the Alta and Snowbird ski resorts 
at the top of Little Cottonwood Canyon, east of Salt 
Lake City, Utah. The Haiks then contacted Alta regarding 
water and sewer services for their lots. Alta responded 
in November, 1994, that it does not provide water and 
sewer services to Albion Basin and referred the Haiks to 
Salt Lake City's Department of Public Utilities, Water 
Division. In April, 1995, the Haiks requested applications 
for building permits and sewer and water services from 
Alta. Alta responded that it would be premature to begin 
the building permit process until the Haiks had procured 
adequate water and approval for a full containment 
sewage holding tank. The Haiks then sought inf onnation 
from Salt Lake City regarding water service to Albion 
Basin. In 1996, Salt Lake City notified the Haiks that it 
declined to consent to the extension of Alta water pipes 
and water supply to Albion Basin, relying on paragraph 
8 of the 1976 Water Supply Agreement and the 1991 
Watershed Ordinance, § 17.04.020 of Salt Lake City's 
Ordinances. 
Alta receives its water supply from Salt Lake City by virtue 
of the August 12, 1976, INTERGOVERNMENTAL 
AGREEMENT-WATER SUPPLY AGREEMENT 
SALT LAKE CITY TO ALTA CITY (the 1976 Water 
Supply Agreement). (Appellants' App. Vol. I, Tab 9.) The 
1976 Water Supply Agreement "make[s] available to Alta 
for its use, ... , the normal flow of raw, untreated water, 
not to exceed 265,000 gallons per day, .... " Id at 97 ,i 1. 
Paragraph 8, relied on by Salt Lake City, contains the 
following restriction: 
8. It is expressly understood and 
agreed that said pipelines shall not 
be extended to or supply water 
to any properties or facilities not 
within the present city limits of Alta 
without the prior written consent of 
[Salt Lake] City. 
Id at 99 iJ 8. It is undisputed that Albion Basin lays beyond 
the 1976 Alta city limits. It is also undisputed that the 
Board of Health required lots to be supplied with 400 
gallons of water per day as a precondition for issuance of 
a building permit and that the lots were each entitled to 
only 50 gallons of water per day from a water agreement 
with Little Cottonwood Water Company. 
In October, 1997, the Haiks initiated this action, claiming 
that because Alta has surplus water and the lots are 
located within the current town limits, Alta had a legal 
duty to supply water to their lots based on Alta1s historical 
conduct and applicable state and federal laws. 1 Id Vol. 
I at 6 ,r 20. The Haiks contended that: (1) Alta had taken 
and damaged their property for public use by refusing 
to extend its municipal services to Albion Basin and by 
its refusal to grant them a building permit, in violation 
of Article I, Section 22 of the Utah Constitution, id. at 
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11 ,i 39; (2) Alta's actions in furtherance of its policy 
of non-development have been arbitrary and capricious, 
depriving them of their right to substantive due process 
and equal protection of the law under the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution and 42 
U.S.C. § 1983, id at 13 ,I 47; (3) Alta's actions deprived 
them of their rights to substantive due process and equal 
protection of the law under Article I, Sections 7 and 24 
of the Utah Constitution and violated the Annexation 
Ordinance and Utah Code section 10-2-401(4), which 
required Alta to make the same level of municipal services 
available to their property as it does to others, id at 14 
1 50; (4) they were entitled to a declaration that the 1976 
Water Supply Agreement does not preclude the extension 
of Alta's water lines to their lots; id at 15 1 54; and (5) 
they were entitled to an injunction preventing Salt Lake 
City from raising the 1976 Water Supply Agreement as a 
defense to the extension of Alta's water lines and requiring 
Alta to make municipal services available to their lots in 
order to receive a building permit, id at 16 ,i 59. 
*2 On October 31, 1997, the district court granted 
summary judgment in favor of Alta and Salt Lake City. 
Id Vol. III at 853-81. On the Haiks' equal protection claim 
against Alta, the district court concluded that the claim 
"presupposed the existence of a legal a duty on the part 
of Alta to supply water to property owners such as the 
Haiks, as well as the legal and physical capacity to do so." 
Id at 860. The court then noted that while Alta may have 
the physical capacity to supply water to the Haiks' lots, 
Alta does not have the legal capacity to do so under the 
terms of the 1976 Water Supply Agreement, without Salt 
Lake City's consent. Id at 865-66. On the Haiks' equal 
protection claim against Salt Lake City, the court found 
that: (a) the Haiks "failed to establish that Salt Lake City 
had breached any duty [to] reasonably ... give or refuse 
consent, whether under the implied covenant of good faith 
dealing, or otherwise," id at 872, and (b) equal protection 
is not available to challenge Salt Lake City's exercise of its 
contractual power to consent pursuant to paragraph 8 of 
the 1976 Water Supply Agreement because it had no legal 
duty to furnish water to users outside its own city limits, 
be they •~similarly situated" or not, id at 873-74. On the 
Haiks' annexation claim, the district court concluded that 
they failed to establish an express legislative or contractual 
duty on the part of Alta to supply water to their property 
and Alta cannot be fairly burdened with an implied legal 
duty to supply water that Alta has no legal right to use. 
Id. at 869. The court then rejected the Haiks' taking claim 
against Alta on the ground that "neither the Hailes nor the 
Town of Alta ha[d] available the water necessary to make 
an 'economically viable use' of the Albion Basin property 
through construction of residential dwelling," id at 877, 
and the Hailes retain the " 'full 'bundle' of property rights' 
they purchased," id at 875. The court reasoned that if the 
loss of economic viability is caused by something other 
than the government regulation, it does not constitute a 
taking. Id at 877. 
On appeal, the Haiks contend that the district court erred: 
(1) in concluding that they could not bring an equal 
protection claim against Salt Lake City because it was 
acting in a proprietary capacity in supplying water outside 
its corporate limits; (2) in concluding that Alta did not 
violate their right to equal protection by refusing to extend 
its water lines to their lots, in view of the district court's 
finding that Alta was physically able to supply water and 
they were willing and able to pay the costs of connection; 
(3) in failing to recognize that Salt Lake City's refusal to 
consent to Alta's extension of water to their lots could not 
be reasonable where it was not based on any finding that 
their proposed use would be detrimental to the watershed, 
but on a collusive desire to prevent any development in 
the upper Albion Basin; and ( 4) in determining no taking 
occurred even though they are completely unable to build 
on their lots. 
*3 We review the district court's order granting summary 
judgment de novo, applying the same standard as the 
district court. Thomas v. International Bus. Machs., 48 
F.3d 478, 484 (10th Cir.1995). Summary judgment is 
appropriate only "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as 
to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled 
to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). 
"We examine the factual record and reasonable inferences 
therefrom in the light most favorable to [the non-
movants], who opposed summary judgment." Thomas, 48 
F.3d at 484. 
Discussion 
I. Equal Protection 
The Hailes argue that they have asserted a viable equal 
protection claim against Salt Lake City. The Hailes 
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maintain that: (1) Salt Lake City's refusal to consent to 
the extension of Alta's water lines to their property is a 
governmental act subject to equal protection challenges, 
and (2) even if Salt Lake City acted in a proprietary rather 
than a governmental capacity, equal protection challenges 
may be raised against governmental entities acting in their 
propriety capacities. The Hailes declare that Salt Lake 
City's refusal to consent to Alta's extension of its water 
lines to their lots could not be reasonable in that it was 
not based on any finding that their proposed use would 
be detrimental to the watershed, but on a collusive desire 
to prevent any development in the upper Albion Basin. 2 
In addition, the Haiks reason that the district court erred 
in concluding that Alta did not violate their right to equal 
protection by refusing to extend its water lines to their 
lots, in view of the district court's finding that Alta was 
physically able to supply water and they were willing and 
able to pay the costs of connection. 3 
A. Federal Equal Protection 
According to the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, "No State shall ... deny to any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of 
the laws." U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. This Clause 
"embodies a general rule that States must treat like cases 
alike but may treat unlike cases accordingly." Vacco 
v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, ----, 117 S.Ct. 2293, 2297, 138 
L.Ed.2d 834 (1997). Unless a legislative classification 
or distinction burdens a fundamental right or targets 
a suspect class, courts will uphold it if it is rationally 
related to a legitimate end. Id 
Tonkovich v. Kansas Bd of Regents. 159 F.3d 504, 532 
(10th Cir .1998). 
"The interest in water for real estate development is not 
a fundamental right." Lockary v. KaJifetz, 917 F.2d 1150, 
1155 (9th Cir.1990). See also O'Neal v. City of Seattle, 
66 F.3d 1064, 1067 (9th Cir.1995) (equal protection claim 
based on denial of water service reviewed under rational 
basis standard because it affects only economic interests, 
not fundamental rights); Magnuson v. City of Hickory 
Hills, 933 F.2d 562, 567 (7th Cir.1991) ("We do not 
consider the right to continued municipal water service 
such a fundamental right; .... "); Ransom v. Marrazzo, 
848 F.2d 398, 413 (3d Cir.1988) (strict scrutiny not 
required because water service is not a fundamental right); 
Chatham v. Jackson, 613 F.2d 73, 80 (5th Cir.1980) 
(water service not a fundamental right). Thus, to meet a 
constitutional challenge the state action in question needs 
only some rational relation to a legitimate state interest. 
City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303, 96 S.Ct. 
2513, 49 L.Ed.2d 511 (1976); Tonkovich, 159 F.3d at 532. 
Moreover, because state action subject to rational basis 
review is presumptively constitutional, the burden is on 
the plaintiffs to establish that the state action is irrational 
or arbitrary and that it cannot conceivably further a 
legitimate governmental interest. Riddle v. Mondragon, 83 
F.3d 1197, 1207 (10th Cir.1996). "Under the rational basis 
test, if there is a 'plausible reason[ ] for [the state] action, 
our inquiry is at an end.' " United States v. Castillo, 140 
F.3d 874,883 (10th Cir.1998) (quoting United States R.R 
Retirement Bd v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 179, 101 S.Ct. 453, 66 
L.Ed.2d 368 (1980)). "We need not find that the legislature 
ever articulated this reason, nor that it actually underlay 
the legislative decision, nor even that it was wise." Id 
(citations omitted). 
r·-, 
~ 
*4 There are plausible reasons for Alta's refusal to G., 
extend its water lines to the Haiks' property. Alta has a 
legitimate state interest in not breaching its 1976 Water 
Supply Agreement. Alta does not have an independent 
right to water; it merely purchases water from Salt Lake 
City. Thus, while Alta may have the physical capacity to 
supply water to the Hailes' lots, it does not have the legal 
right to do so, and to compel Alta to breach its contract 
would be unreasonable. Nor, we add, does Alta have a 
legal obligation under Utah law to provide the Hailes 
with water. A series of Utah Supreme Court cases have 
specifically expressed that "a municipal corporation ... 
does not have a legal duty to provide water service to 
all members of the public .... " Thompson v. Salt Lake 
City Corp., 724 P.2d 958, 959 (Utah 1986). See Rose 
v. Plymouth, 110 Utah 358, 173 P.2d 285, 286 (Utah 
1946). The Utah Supreme Court recently reinforced that 
a municipality need only act "reasonably" with respect to 
the provision of municipal services to its residents. See 
Platt v. Town of Torrey, 949 P.2d 325,329 (1997). We find 
Alta treated the Hailes reasonably here. 
Furthermore, Salt Lake City has a legitimate interest in 
preserving its watershed. The Hailes failed to establish 
that Salt Lake City's refusal to consent to the extension 
of Alta's water lines to their property was irrational 
or arbitrary or that it could not conceivably further 
a legitimate governmental interest in view of the 
extensive evidence presented by Salt Lake City regarding 
preservation of its watershed, Little Cottonwood Canyon. 
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The Hailes challenge Salt Lake City's stated interest in 
protecting the watershed by noting Salt Lake City has 
consented to other extensions and uses not contemplated 
by the 1976 Water Supply Agreement. The additional 
uses referred to are Alta's 1995 extension, without Salt 
Lake City's consent, of its lines to the Alpenglow Lodge, 
Salt Lake City's consent in 1988 and again in 1993 
to allow Alta Ski Lifts Company to use additional 
water for snowmaking, and Salt Lake City's consent in 
1992 to provide water to the U.S. Forest Service for 
recreational purposes at the Albion Basin campground. 
Because Alpenglow sits within Alta's 1976 boundaries, 
extension of the lines without Salt Lake City's consent 
was appropriate and is irrelevant to plaintiffs' claim of 
unequal and irrational treatment. This same explanation 
applies to Salt Lake City's 1988 consent for snowmaking 
purposes, which was similarly limited. Finally, the City's 
1992 consent to allow the Forest Service to use water 
for recreational purposes and 1993 consent to allow 
additional snowmaking were authorized by 1991 Salt 
Lake City ordinance § 17.04.020.B, which authorized 
the City to consent only to use for snowmaking or fire 
protection, use by certain governmental entities on land 
owned or leased by those entities, and use by residential 
property owners with a spring on their property. See 
Appellant's App. at 327-28. Significantly,§ 17.04 prohibits 
the City from consenting to any use-including extension of 
Alta's water lines to the Hailes' property-other than these 
three articulated uses, or amending any current permit to 
enlarge the service boundary or increase the water supply. 
See id at 327. The Salt Lake City Council bas made 
a rational legislative determination that the particular 
uses above, even if outside existing service areas, will 
not result in significant harm to the watershed, whereas 
increased residential and commercial use outside existing 
service areas (in this case Alta's 1976 town boundaries) will 
result in such damage. This classification is rational and 
is related to the City's stated objective of protecting the 
watershed. 
*5 In short, AJta and Salt Lake City proffer they had 
to draw the line somewhere, and chose to do so in the 
1976 Agreement at Alta's 1976 town boundaries. They do 
not claim to be seeking to stop all development in the 
canyon, or even all development in Alta for that matter. 
Rather, their purported objective is to curtail further 
environmentally harmful development outside Alta's 1976 
town boundaries. Line-drawing "inevitably requires that 
some persons who have an almost equally strong claim to 
favored treatment be placed on different sides of the lines. 
[That] the line might have been drawn differently at some 
points is" not a matter for judicial consideration. Federal 
Communications Comm'n v. Beach Communications, Inc., 
508 U.S. 307, 315-16, 113 S.Ct. 2096, 124 L.Ed.2d 211 
( quoting United States RR Retirement Bd v. Fritz, 449 
U.S. 166, 179, 101 S.Ct. 453, 66 L.Ed.2d 368 (1980)). 
B. Utah Equal Protection 
Article I, § 24 of the Utah Constitution states: "All 
laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation." 
Utah Const. Art. I, § 24. Although this language is 
dissimilar to its federal counterpart, "these provisions 
embody the same general principle: persons similarly 
situated should be treated similarly, and persons in 
different circumstances should not be treated as if their 
circumstances were the same." Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 
661, 669 (Utah 1984). "First, a law must apply equally 
to all persons within a class." Id at 670. "Second, 
the statutory classifications and the different treatment 
given the classes must be based on differences that have 
a reasonable tendency to further the objectives of the 
statute." Id If the relationship of the classification to 
the objectives is unreasonable or fanciful, the disparate 
treatment is unreasonable. Id We presume that the state 
acted on a reasonable basis. Id at 671 n. 14. However, that 
presumption does not require us to accept any conceivable 
reason for the state action. Id "Rather, we judge such 
enactments on the basis of reasonable or actual ... 
purpose." Id Additionally, amunicipalcorporation "does 
not have a legal duty to provide water service to all 
members of the public, .... " Thompson v. Salt Lake City 
Corp., 724 P.2d 958,959 (Utah 1986). 
Alta consistently refused to extend ~ts water lines outside 
its 1976 city limits without Salt Lake City's permission. 
Thus, Alta treats all persons in the class of property 
owners outside its 1976 city limits, including the Haiks, 
the same. Furthermore, Alta's and Salt Lake City's actions 
were reasonable. 
Therefore, we bold that Alta and Salt Lake City did not 
violate the Haiks' equal protection rights under either 
federal or state law. 
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II. Taking 
*6 The Haiks contend that the district court erred in 
determining no taking occurred even though they are 
completely unable to build on their lots. The Hailes assert 
that it is immaterial that Alta has not expressly prohibited 
building in the Albion Basin because by denying them 
a building permit for their lots without culinary water, 
Alta has deprived them of all viable economic use of 
their property. Additionally, the Haiks point out that a 
regulatory taking can exist even when no exaction has 
been demanded by the state and that it is immaterial that 
the applicable regulations and ordinances predated their 
ownershlp as a property owner can "come" to a taking. 4 
The Haiks brought their taking claim exclusively under 
Article I, § 22 of the Utah Constitution, whlch provides, 
"Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public 
use without just compensation." 5 Utah Const. Art. I, §22. 
"This provision is broader in its language than the similar 
provision in the Fifth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution." Bagford v. Ephraim City, 904 P.2d 1095, 
1097 (Utah 1995). To recover, "a claimant must possess a 
protectable interest in property that is taken or damaged 
for a public use." Id See Farmers New World Life Ins. 
Co. v. Bountiful City, 803 P.2d 1241, 1243-44 (Utah 1990); 
Colman v. Utah State Land Bd, 795 P.2d 622, 625 (Utah 
1990). In Colman, the Utah Supreme Court observed: 
Many statutes and ordinances regulate what a property 
owner can do with and pn the owner1s property. Those 
regulations may have a significant impact on the utility 
or value of property, yet they generally do not require 
compensation under article I, section 22. Only when 
governmental action rises to the level of a taking or 
damage under article I, section 22 is the State required 
to pay compensation. 
Coleman, 795 P.2d at 627. "[A] 'taking' is 'any 
subst~tial interference with private property which 
destroys or materially lessens its value, or by which 
the owner's right to its use and enjoyment is in any 
substantial degree abridged or destroyed.' " Id at 626 
(quoting State ex rel., State Road Comm'n v. District 
Court, Fourth Judicial Dist. in and for Utah County, 94 
Utah 384, 78 P.2d 502, 506 (Utah 1937)). 
Footnotes 
The district court found that "[t]he Hai.ks still have in 
October 1997 what they purchased from Marvin Melville 
in October of 1994: lots in Albion Basin Subdivision # 1 
with appurtenant water rights limited to 50 gallons per day 
per unit under the 1963 agreement. They retain the "full 
'bundle' of property rights" they purchased." (Appellants' 
App. Vol. III at 875.) "[T]hey still lack the "one 'strand' of 
the bundle" that their predecessor in interest also did not 
have: a legal right to use water in an amount sufficient to 
satisfy the health department requirement of 400 gallons 
per day per unit." Id at 876. The district court determined 
that "[t]he Haiks cannot build on their property, not 
because Alta or Salt Lake City have changed the rules, but 
rather because the rules remain the same." Id 
*7 The Haiks cannot maintain a taking claim because 
they did not have a protectable interest in property that 
was taken or damaged by Alta1s denial of a building 
permit. Alta's denial of a building permit was based 
on the health department requirement of 400 gallons 
of water per day per unit, which the Hailes did not 
meet. As the Court in Coleman pointed out, " '[m]any 
statutes and ordinances regulate what a property owner 
can do with and on the owner1s property . .. yet they 
generally do not require compensation .... " Coleman, 795 
P.2d at 627. This is but one of many such regulations. 
See Smith Inv. Co. v. Sandy City, 958 P.2d 245, 253 (Utah 
Ct.App.1998) ("If the ordinance and the state policies 
and reasons underlying it do, within reason, debatably 
promote the legitimate goals of increased public health, 
safety, or general welfare, we must allow . . . legislative 
judgment to control."). Furthermore, mere expectation of 
municipal water service in the future is not a legal right 
that constitutes property subject to taking. See Bagford, 
904 P.2d at 1099 (expectation of renewal of lease not 
property subject to taking). Therefore, we bold that no 
taking occurred under the Utah Constitution Article I, § 
22. 
AFFIRMED. 
All Citations 
176 F.3d 488 (Table), 1999 WL 190717, 1999 CJ C.A.R. 
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5 
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral 
estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may 
be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 
The Haiks initiated this action in the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah. (Appellants' 
App. Vol. I at 1.) Salt Lake City removed the action to federal district court. Id. at 34. 
We assume for the purposes of this discussion only that the Haiks may maintain an equal protection claim against Salt 
Lake City. 
The Haiks initially brought their equal protection claim under both the United States Constitution and the Utah Constitution. 
It is unclear whether the district court considered their equal protection claim under both state and federal law or solely 
under state law. It is also unclear under which their appeal lies. However, in the interests of finality, we will consider their 
claim under both federal and state law. 
The Haiks brought this claim solely against Alta. Therefore, we will not consider the Haiks' statements on appeal that, "No 
taking of the full economic use of the Haiks' property occurred until Salt Lake City denied its consent to extend water to 
them in 1996. In refusing to consent, Salt Lake City went beyond what the relevant background principles would dictate 
and hence worked a taking." (Brief for Appellants at 37) (internal quotation and citations omitted}. 
Therefore, we will not consider the Haiks' appellate arguments that Alta's actions constitute a taking under the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. See Brief for Appellants at 32 ("The denial of a building permit 
to the Haiks constitutes a taking for which the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments require just compensation, .... "); id. at 37. 
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United States District Court, 
D. Utah, 
Central Division. 
Mark Charles HAIK, an Individual; and 
Raymond A. Haik, an Individual, Plaintiffs, 
V. 
SALT LAKE CI1Y CORPORATION; a municipal 
corporation; Jeffery Thomas Niermeyer, an 
Individual; Town of Alta; a municipal corporation; 
and John Guldner an Individual, Defendants. 
No. 2:12-CV-997 TS. 
I 
March 12, 2013. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
AND ORDER GRANTING 
DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS TO DISMISS 
TED STEWART, District Judge. 
*1 This matter is before the Court on three motions 
to dismiss: (1) Defendants Salt Lake City and Town 
of Alta's Joint Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss; (2) 
Defendant Jeffery T. Niermeyer's Rule 12(b)(6) Motion 
to Dismiss; and (3) Defendant John Guldner's F.R.C.P. 
12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. 
For the reasons discussed below, the Court will grant 
Defendants' Motions and dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint. 
I. MOTION TO DISMISS STANDARD 
In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a 
claim upon which relief can be granted under Rule 12(b) 
(6), all well-pleaded factual allegations, as distinguished 
from conclusory allegations, are accepted as true and 
viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs as the 
nonmoving party. 1 Plaintiffs must provide "enough facts 
to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face" 2 
which requires "more than an unadorned, the-defendant-
unlawfully harmed-me accusation." 3 "A pleading that 
offers 'labels and conclusions' or 'a formulaic recitation 
of the elements of a cause of action will not do.' Nor 
does a complaint suffice if it tenders 'naked assertion[s]' 
devoid of 'further factual enhancement.' " 4 "The court1s 
function on a Rule l 2(b )( 6) motion is not to weigh 
potential evidence that the parties might present at trial, 
but to assess whether the plaintiffs complaint alone is 
legally sufficient to state a claim for which relief may be 
granted." 5 As the Court in Iqbal stated, 
only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief 
survives a motion to dismiss. Detennin.ing whether a 
complaint states a plausible claim for relief will ... be a 
context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to 
draw on its judicial experience and common sense. But 
where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to 
infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the 
complaint has alleged-but it has not show[n]-that the 
pleader is entitled to relief. 6 
When considering the adequacy of a plaintiffs allegations 
in a complaint subject to a motion to dismiss, a 
district court not only considers the complaint, but also 
"documents incorporated into the complaint by reference, 
and matters of which a court may take judicial notice." 7 
Thus, "notwithstanding the usual rule that a court should 
consider no evidence beyond the pleadings on a Rule 
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, '[a] district court may consider 
documents referred to in the complaint if the documents 
are central to the plaintiffs claim and the parties do not 
dispute the documents' authenticity.'" 8 
II. BACKGROUND 
The following facts are taken from Plaintiffs' Complaint, 
the materials attached thereto, and other documents 
referenced by the parties. The facts are viewed in the light 
most favorable to Plaintiffs and are accepted as true for 
the purposes of Defendants' Motions. 
Plaintiffs Mark and Raymond Haik (the "Hailes") own 
certain parcels of land in the Albion Basin (hereinafter 
"Albion Basin Subdivision"). The Albion Basin is located 
above the Alta and Snowbird ski resorts at the top 
of Little Cottonwood Canyon in Salt Lake County, 
Utah. To properly understand the current dispute, it is 
necessary to understand the contractual, regulatory, and 
legal background concerning water in the Albion Basin. 
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*2 In 1963, Canyonlands, Inc., an apparent predecessor 
in interest to Plaintiffs, entered into a contract with the 
Little Cottonwood Water Company, which promised the 
availability of not more than 50 gallons per day to users 
in each of not more than 35 cabins to be constructed 
in Albion Basin Subdivision # 1. Salt Lake City later 
succeeded to the Little Cottonwood Water Company's 
obligations under various water supply agreements, 
including the 1963 agreement. 
In 1971, Marvin Melville, from whom Plaintiffs would 
later purchase their lots, applied for a permit "to 
construct a four-plex on lots in an approved subdivision 
known as Albion Basin Subdivision # I." 9 Salt Lake 
County refused to grant the permits, maintaining that 
the plaintiffs "had not proved their rights to an adequate 
culinary water supply." 10 Mr. Melville sought mandamus 
relief from the U tab courts. 
In order to obtain a building permit, the county required 
400 gallons of water per day, per unit. Mr. Melville argued 
that he had sufficient water to meet these requirements, 
pointing to a spring and the agreement with the Little 
Cottonwood Water Company. The Utah Supreme Court 
found that Melville did not own the rights to the spring 
water. The court also found that the agreement with 
the Little Cottonwood Water Company did not provide 
sufficient water. As stated, that agreement only allowed 
for "a quantity of water not to exceed 50 gallons per 
day." 11 Based on this, the Utah Supreme Court found 
that "[a]t most plaintiffs have proved that they may have 
a right to 50 gallons of water per unit constructed, which 
does not meet the County Board of Health's requirement 
of 400 gallons per unit per day." 12 As a result, the Utah 
Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of Mr. 
Melville's request for mandamus relief. 
In 1976, Salt Lake City and the Town of Alta entered into 
the Water Supply Agreement. Under the Water Supply 
Agreement, Salt Lake City agreed "to make available to 
Alta for its use, as hereinafter describe4 the normal flow 
of raw, untreated water, not to exceed 265,000 gallons per 
day." 13 However, the Water Supply Agreement stated 
that Alta's water "pipelines shall not be extended to or 
supply water to any properties or facilities not within 
the present city limits of Alta without the prior written 
consent of' Salt Lake City. 14 The Haiks' property lies 
outside the Alta city limits as they existed in 1976. 
In 1991, Salt Lake City adopted its Watershed Ordinance. 
Among other things, the Watershed Ordinance prohibited 
Salt Lake City from entering into any new water sales 
agreements or expanding any existing agreements, with 
three exceptions: (1) water sales for residential use to 
property owners with a spring on the property; (2) water 
sales to governmental entities for use on land they own 
or lease; or (3) water sales for snowmaking and fire 
protection in certain cases. 
Plaintiffs "stepped into this milieu" when they purchased 
their lots from Mr. Melville in 1994. 15 After purchasing 
the property, the Haiks sought water from Alta. Alta 
informed Plaintiffs that it did not provide water and sewer 
services to their property, and referred them to the Salt 
Lake City Department of Public Works. Salt Lake City, 
in turn, declined to consent to an extension of Alta water 
pipes and water supply to Plaintiffs' property, relying 
on the Water Supply Agreement and the Watershed 
Ordinance. 
*3 Plaintiffs brought suit against Alta and Salt Lake 
City, alleging that Alta had a legal duty to extend 
municipal water service to their lots and that, without such 
extension, they were entitled to just compensation for a 
taking of their property. Plaintiffs brought various claims, 
including claims that Alta and Salt Lake City violated the 
equal protection, due process, and takings clauses of the 
United States and Utah constitutions. 
That matter was eventually removed to this Court and was 
heard by the Honorable Judge Bruce Jenkins. On October 
31, 1997, Judge Jenkins granted summary judgment in 
favor of Alta and Salt Lake City. In a thorough decision, 
Judge Jenkins rejected all of Plaintiffs' claims. 
Judge Jenkins first rejected Plaintiffs' equal protection 
claims against Alta. Plaintiff had argued "that Alta, by 
refusing their requests to extend water service to the 
Haiks' Albion Basin properties, has acted in arbitrary 
and irrational fashion and has thereby denied the Haiks 
equal protection of the law." 16 But this "contention 
presupposes the existence of a legal duty on the part 
of Alta to supply water to property owners such as the 
Hailes, as well as the legal and physical capacity to do 
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so." 17 Judge Jenkins held that Alta had no duty to supply 
water and that their capacity to do so was constrained 
by the Water Supply Agreement. Thus, the Court held 
that "[w]ater is not available to the Hailes under the Water 
Supply Agreement absent Salt Lake City's consent to an 
extension of service beyond Alta's 1976 limits. Where Salt 
Lake City withholds consent, Alta has no legal right to 
extend water service to the Haiks." 18 
Judge Jenkins found: 
The Hailes have established no express legislative or 
contractual duty on the part of Alta to supply water 
to Albion Basin Subdivision # 1. Alta cannot fairly be 
burdened with an implied legal duty to supply water 
that Alta has no legal right to use. Nor can it fairly 
be said that Alta has denied to any person the equal 
protection of its laws simply because it has failed to 
supply what it does not have the legal right to supply. 
It is Salt Lake City, not Alta, that holds the rioht and ::, 
exercises the power. 
If a duty to supply water exists, that duty must devolve 
upon the entity with legal right to, and lawful control of 
the water that may be physically available to the Haiks' 
property-Salt Lake City. 19 
The Court then turned to the Haiks' claims against Salt 
Lake City. The Hailes asserted "no duty on the part of Salt 
Lake City to supply water to the Albion Basin property" 
as their property was beyond the city limits. 20 However, 
the city could supply surplus water if it chose to do so, but 
the city was not required to do so. 
The Hailes argued that the refusal by the city to provide 
water breached the covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing. Judge Jenkins rejected this claim, finding that 
"the Haiks have failed to establish that Salt Lake City 
has breached any duty reasonably to give or refuse 
consent, whether under the implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing, or otherwise." 21 The Court also 
rejected the Haiks' equal protection claim against the city, 
finding that "[t]he equal prot~tion yardstick is simply 
not available to measure Salt Lake City's exercise of its 
contractual power to consent pursuant to ... the Water 
Supply Agreement." 22 
*4 Judge Jenkins also rejected the Haiks' talcinas claim e ' 
stating: 
The Haiks still have in October 
of 1997 what they purchased from 
Marvin Melville in October of 1994: 
lots in Albion Basin Subdivision 
# 1 with appurtenant water rights 
limited to 50 gallons per day per 
unit under the 1963 agreement. 
They retain the full bundle of 
property rights they purchased. And 
notwithstanding the Haiks' assertion 
that at the time of annexation, 
Albion Basin property owners had 
a right to expect that they would 
be able to build homes on their 
land, they still lack one strand of 
the bundle that their predecessor 
in interest also did not have: a 
legal right to use water in an 
amount sufficient to satisfy the 
health department requirement of 
400 gallons per day per unit. 
The Haiks cannot build on their 
property, not because Alta or Salt 
Lake City have changed the rules, 
but rather because the rules remain 
the same. 23 
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed Judge 
Jenkins' summary judgment ruling in all respects. 24 
On Plaintiffs' equal protection challenge, the Tenth 
Circuit held that " '[t]he interest in water for real estate 
development is not a fundamental right.' " 25 Thus, to 
overcome Plaintiffs' challenge, Alta and Salt Lake City 
needed only "some rational relation to a legitimate state 
interest.'' 26 The Tenth Circuit found that Alta had a 
legitimate interest in refusing to extend its water lines 
to the Haiks' property, namely not breaching the 1976 
Water Supply Agreement. "Thus, while Alta may have the 
physical capacity to supply water to the Hailes' lots, it does 
not have the legal right to do so, and to compel Alta to 
breach its contract would be unreasonable." 27 The Tenth 
Circuit further found that "Salt Lake City has a legitimate 
interest in preserving its watershed" and that "[t]he Haiks 
failed to establish that Salt Lake City's refusal to consent 
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to the extension of Alta's water lines to their property as 
irrational or arbitrary." 28 
In short, Alta and Salt Lake City proffer they had to 
draw the line somewhere, and chose to do so in the 
1976 Agreement at Alta's 1976 town boundaries. They 
do not claim to be seeking to stop all development in 
the canyon, or even all development in Alta for that 
matter. Rather, their purported objective is to curtail 
further environmentally harmful development outside 
Alta's 1976 town boundaries. Line-drawing inevitably 
requires that some persons who have an almost equally 
strong claim to favored treatment be placed on different 
sides of the lines. [[hat] the line might have been drawn 
differently at some points is not a matter for judicial 
consideration. 29 
The Tenth Circuit also rejected Plaintiffs' takings claim. 
The Haiks cannot maintain a taking claim because 
they did not have a protectable interest in property 
that was taken or damaged by Alta's denial of a 
building permit. Alta's denial of a building permit was 
based on the health department requirement of 400 
gallons of water per day per unit, which the Haiks did 
not meet. 30 
*5 Around the same time as this litigation was occurring 
in this Court, Salt Lake City filed certain change 
applications with the State Engineer that are at the center 
of Plaintiffs' Complaint here. 
Under Utah law, a person entitled to use water may 
change a point of diversion, place of use, or purpose of 
water use by filing a change application with the State 
Engineer. 31 If certain requirements are met, the State 
Engineer may approve a change application. 32 However, 
the State Engineer has no authority to determine the rights 
of parties, and proceedings before the State Engineer do 
not constitute adjudications of water rights. 33 
If an application is granted, the person is authorized to 
proceed with the construction of necessary works, take 
any steps required to apply the water to the use named in 
the application, and perfect the proposed application. 34 
Within the time set out by the State Engineer, the 
applicant must construct any necessary works, apply the 
water to beneficial use, and file proof with the State 
Engineer. 35 The State Engineer may extend the time 
required to construct necessary works and put the water 
to beneficial use. 36 If the State Engineer is satisfied that 
the application bas been perfected and the water has been 
put to beneficial use, the state engineer will issue a change 
certificate. 37 Applicants may withdraw their application 
or simply let it lapse. 38 
At issue here are certain change applications filed by 
Salt Lake City: applications a16846 and al6844. These 
applications were approved by the State Engineer and 
have been extended. However, there is nothing in the 
record to suggest that the applications have been perfected 
or that a certificate of change has been issued. 
The change applications become important because Judge 
Jenkins, as part of the summary judgment process, 
"requested the submission of additional data concerning 
water availability." 39 Defendants did not disclose the 
change applications in their response to Judge Jenkins. 
However, Salt Lake City did disclose the water quantities 
it had committed by contract to the Alta and Albion 
Basin areas. In its submission, Salt Lake City noted "that 
the decision to refuse to deliver water [to the Haiks] was 
not primarily based upon availability but rather upon the 
terms of the Water Sales Agreement and sound watershed 
management and water quality practices . " 40 
In September 2010, Plaintiff Mark Haik applied to the Salt 
Lake Valley Health Department for waste water system 
approval for single family residences in the Albion Basin 
Subdivision, and also filed an application with the Town 
of Alta for a building permit. In response, Defendant 
Niermeyer, the Director of Salt Lake City's Department 
of Public Utilities, sent a letter to the Salt Lake Valley 
Heath Department and the Town Administrator of Alta, 
Defendant Guldner, in which he stated: 
The Albion Basin Subdivision is currently allowed 
water use under a water Agreement dated May 22, 
1963 between Canyonlands, Inc. and Salt Lake City 
as the successor in interest to the Little Cottonwood 
Water Company. The amount of water allowed under 
the contract cannot exceed 50 gallons per day per 
connection. 
*6 Mr. Haik has requested certification of water 
for the two above-noted properties.... Based on our 
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understanding of the State requirement of 400 gpd, 
and Fire Department requirement of 1750 gpm ... the 
contracted amount is insufficient to meet the current 
standards for water supply. 41 
On December 13, 2011, the Salt Lake Valley Heath 
Department denied PJaintiffs' applications for waste water 
systems finding, in part, that Plaintiffs were unable to 
show a sufficient water supply. This decision was upheld 
by a hearing officer on October 24, 2012. 42 
The following day, Plaintiffs brought this action. 
Plaintiffs' Complaint contains the following claims: (1) 
an action to set aside judgment; (2) violation of equal 
protection; (3) violation of substantive due process; (4) 
violation of procedural due process; ( 5) misrepresentation; 
and (6) civil conspiracy. 
III. DISCUSSION 
All of Plaintiffs' claims center around the change 
applications. Plaintiffs argue that the change applications 
show that water is available and should be provided 
to them. Plaintiffs argue that, by failing to disclose 
or intentionally withholding information about the 
change applications, Defendants engaged in all sorts of 
malfeasance. Thus, in order for any of Plaintiffs' claims 
to succeed, Plaintiffs must show that they are entitled to 
water and that Defendants have refused to provide water 
to which they are entitled. 
Unfortunately for Plaintiffs, they cannot make this 
showing. Alta has refused to provide water because it 
cannot do so under its contract with Salt Lake City. 
The city, in turn, has declined to provide water based 
on the 1963 Agreement and to further its interest in the 
protection of the watershed. 
Plaintiffs point to the change applications to rebut the 
reasons put forth by Alta and SaJt Lake City, but 
Plaintiffs have failed to provide any allegations that the 
change applications entitle them to water. While the 
change applications may show some future ability for 
Salt Lake City to provide water to the Albion Basin 
Subdivision, there is no obligation to do so. The only 
water right that Plaintiffs have shown is set forth in the 
1963 Agreement. As has been stated by the Salt Lake 
Valley Health Department, the Utah Supreme Court, the 
District Court for the District of Utah, and the Tenth 
Circuit Court of Appeals, that amount is insufficient to 
allow for development. 
Based on this simple fact, all of Plaintiffs' claims fail and 
Defendants' Motions to Dismiss must be granted. Though 
the Court could simply grant Defendants' Motion on this 
ground, the other arguments presented by Defendants 
provide additional grounds to warrant dismissal. 
A. RES nJDICATA 
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs' claims are largely 
barred by res judicata. "The doctrine of res judicata 
embraces two distinct branches: claim preclusion and 
issue preclusion." 43 "Claim preclusion involves the same 
parties or their privies and also the same cause of action, 
and thls precludes the relitigation of all issues that could 
have been litigated as well as those that were, in fact, 
litigated in the prior action." 44 "Issue preclusion, on the 
other hand, arises from a different cause of action and 
prevents parties or their privies from relitigating facts and 
issues in the second suit that were fully litigated in the first 
suit." 45 
*7 In order for claim preclusion to bar a subsequent 
cause of action, the following requirements must be met: 
(1) both cases must involve the same parties or their 
privies; (2) the claim that is alleged to be barred must have 
been presented in the first suit or must be one that could 
and should have been raised in the first action; and (3) 
the first suit must have resulted in a finaJjudgment on the 
merits. 46 
Issue preclusion applies when the following four elements 
are met: (1) the party against whom issue preclusion is 
asserted must have been a party to, or in privity with, a 
party to the prior adjudication; (2) the issue decided in the 
prior adjudication must be identical to the one presented 
in the instant action; (3) the issue in the first action must 
have been completely, fully, and fairly litigated; and (4) 
the first suit must have resulted in a finaJjudgment on the 
merits. 47 
In this case, the amount of water to which Plaintiffs are 
entitled under the 1963 Agreement, as well as the majority 
of the constitutional claims, have been decided and are 
barred by res judicata. Therefore, they must be dismissed. 
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Plaintiffs argue that res judicata does not apply because 
of a change in circumstance. However, the only difference 
between this case and the prior cases involving Plaintiffs 
or their privies is the change applications. As discussed, 
the State Engineer has no authority to determine the rights 
of parties, and proceedings before the State Engineer do 
not constitute adjudications of water rights. Thus, there 
is nothing in the change applications that either entitles 
Plaintiffs to water or requires Defendants to provide that 
water. Plaintiffs' only claim to water is the same as it has 
always been. Therefore, Plaintiffs' claims are barred. 
B. ACTION TO SET ASIDE JUDGMENT 
Plaintiffs bring an independent action to set aside 
judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(d)(l) and (3). Rule 
60(d)(l) and (3) provide that the rule does not limit a 
court's power to entertain an independent action to relieve 
a party from a judgment, or set aside a judgment for fraud 
on the court. 
1. Rule 60( d) (J) 
Plaintiffs bring an independent action under Rule 60(d). 
In United States v. Beggerly, 48 the United States Supreme 
Court held that "[i]ndependent actions must ... be 
reserved for those cases of 'injustices which, in certain 
circumstances, are deemed sufficiently gross to demand 
a departure' from rigid adherence to the doctrine of 
res judicata." 49 Thus, "an independent action should 
be available only to prevent a grave miscarriage of 
justice." SO In Beggerly, the Court found that a party 
failing to make a full disclosure to the trial court did "not 
nearly approach this demanding standard." 51 
In this case, Plaintiffs' plausible allegations state 
that Defendants failed to provide allegedly relevant 
information to the Court, specifically the existence of the 
change applications. As stated, the change applications do 
not grant Plaintiffs any water rights and do not impose 
upon Defendants any duty to provide Plaintiffs water. 
Therefore, the relevance of such information to the earlier 
proceedings in this Court is minimal. 
*8 Even taking as true Plaintiffs' allegation that 
Defendants withheld this information, such an allegation 
does not meet the high burden necessary to bring an 
independent action. This case is similar to the facts of 
Beggerly, where a party failed to make a full disclosure to 
the court. The Supreme Court found that such conduct 
did not meet the "demanding standard" required for an 
independent action to set aside judgment. The same can 
be said here. Therefore, Plaintiffs have failed to show that 
setting aside the judgment is necessary to prevent a grave 
miscarriage of justice. 
2. Rule 60( d)(3) 
Plaintiffs further allege fraud on the court. 
Fraud on the court ... is fraud which 
is directed to the judicial machinery 
itself and is not fraud between the 
parties or fraudulent documents, 
false statements or perjury. It 
has been held that allegations of 
nondisclosure in pretrial discovery 
will not support an action for fraud 
on the court. It is thus fraud ... where 
the impartial functions of the court 
have been directly corrupted. 52 
The Tenth Circuit has stated: 
Generally speaking, only the most 
egregious misconduct, such as 
bribery of a judge or members 
of a jury, or the fabrication of 
evidence by a party in which an 
attorney is implicated will constitute 
a fraud on the court. Less egregious 
misconduct, such as nondisclosure 
to the court of facts allegedly 
pertinent to the matter before it, will 
not ordinarily rise to the level of 
fraud on the court. 53 
The court has further stated: 
We think it clear that "fraud 
on the court," whatever else it 
embodies, requires a showing that 
one has acted with an intent to 
deceive or defraud the court. A 
proper balance between the interests 
underlying finality on the one 
hand and allowing relief due to 
\t'lE.Sf.lAV!/ © 2016 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 6 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Haik v. Salt Lake City Corp., Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2013) 
2013 WL 968141 
inequitable conduct on the other 
makes it essential that there be a 
showing of conscious wrongdoing-
what can properly be characterized 
as a deliberate scheme to defraud-
before relief from a final judgment 
is appropriate under the Hazel-
Atlas standard. Thus, when there is 
no intent to deceive, the fact that 
misrepresentations were made to a 
court is not of itself a sufficient basis 
for setting aside a judgment under 
the guise of "fraud on the court.,, 54 
Fraud upon the court must be proven by clear and 
convincing evidence. 55 
In this case, the Court is presented with, at most, 
nondisclosure of facts allegedly pertinent to the case 
before Judge Jenkins. The Tenth Circuit has made clear 
that such misconduct does not ordinarily rise to the level 
of fraud on_ the Court. Though Plaintiffs do their best to 
impute an evil intent to Defendants, their allegations falls 
short of what is required to substantiate a claim of fraud 
on the Court. Therefore, this claim must be dismissed. 
C. CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS 
1. Equal Protection 
Plaintiffs appear to assert a class-of-one theory. To 
prevail under a class-of-one theory, "a plaintiff must 
first establish that others, 'similarly situated in every 
material respect' were treated differently." 56 "A plaintiff 
must then show this difference in treatment was 
without rational basis, that is, the government action 
was irrational and abusive and wholly unrelated to 
any legitimate state activity." 57 The Tenth Circuit 
has "recognized a substantial burden that plaintiffs 
demonstrate others similarly situated in all material 
respects were treated differently and that there is no 
objectively reasonable basis for the defendant's action." 58 
The Tenth Circuit has also recently clarified that, under 
Twombly and Iqbal, a plaintiff must meet this "substantial 
burden" by offering "enough specific factual allegations 
to 'nudge[] their claims across the line from conceivable 
to plausible.' " 59 
*9 Plaintiffs' Complaint fails to meet these pleading 
standards. Plaintiffs make the conclusory allegation that 
they are similarly situated to other landowners. However, 
there are not sufficient factual allegations to support 
these conclusory statements. Further, Plaintiffs' equal 
protection claim fails because Plaintiffs cannot show that 
any differential treatment was without a rational basis. 
As has been held by this Court and the Tenth Circuit, 
there are legitimate reasons to deny Plaintiffs' requests 
for water rights: compliance with contract provisions and 
protection of the watershed. 
Plaintiffs point to a provision of the Utah constitution and 
two decisions from the Utah Supreme Court in support 
of their argument, but they are not helpful. Plaintiffs rely 
on Article XI, Section 6 of the Utah constitution. That 
provision states that municipalities are forbidden from 
leasing, selling, alienating, or disposing their waterworks, 
water rights, or sources of water supply, but that such may 
be used to supply its inhabitants with water at reasonable 
charges. Next, Plaintiffs cite to County Water System, Inc. 
v. Salt Lake City, 60 where the Utah Supreme court held 
that Salt Lake City may sell and distribute surplus water 
beyond its corporate limits. 61 Finally, Plaintiffs cite Platt 
v. Town of Torrey, 62 which stands for the proposition that 
municipalities must deal reasonably with nonresidents 
who purchase surplus water from the municipality. 63 
Plaintiffs read these together as requiring the city to 
provide water to them, especially in light of the change 
applications whlch, if perfected, would allow the city 
to do so. However, Plaintiffs read too much into this 
constitutional provision and these two cases. When read 
together, these statements do not require the city to 
provide water to Plaintiffs, they merely permit the city 
to do so and, if the city so chooses, a reasonableness 
requirement is imposed. Nor do these provisions stand 
for the proposition that the city cannot have legitimate 
reasons (such as the protection of the watershed) to 
decline to supply water to nonresidents. Therefore, these 
provisions are not helpful to Plaintiffs and do not save this 
claim from dismissal. 
2. Substantive Due Process 
"Substantive due process bars 'certain government 
actions regardless of the fairness of the procedures 
used to implement them.' " 64 "Executive action violates 
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substantive due process when it 'can properly be 
characterized as arbitrary, or conscience shocking, in a 
constitutional sense.' " 65 
Plaintiffs' Complaint falls well short of this standard. All 
that Plaintiffs' allegations reveal is that Sale Lake City 
and Alta have consistently taken the same position toward 
Plaintiffs. That is, Alta has refused to extend its water 
lines to Plaintiffs' property, because it is barred from doing 
so by its agreement with Salt Lake City, and Salt Lake 
City has consistently refused Plaintiffs' requests for water. 
Plaintiffs have failed to provide anything showing that the 
city cannot so refuse. As Plaintiffs have failed to establish 
any right to water, and indeed several courts have detailed 
exactly why Plaintiffs do not have any such right, there 
is nothing about the Defendants' actions that shock the 
conscience. 
3. Procedural Due Process 
*10 "To assess whether an individual was denied 
procedural due process, courts must engage in a two-step 
inquiry: (1) did the individual possess a protected interest 
such that the due process protections were applicable; and, 
if so, then (2) was the individual afforded an appropriate 
level of process." 66 
As is detailed above, Plaintiffs and their predecessor 
in interest have been afforded an appropriate level of 
process. Plaintiffs have repeatedly requested and been 
denied water sufficient to allow for the development of 
their property. Their latest request was denied by the 
Salt Lake Valley Health Department. That denial was 
subsequently upheld by a hearing officer. In addition 
to being heard by state administrative bodies, Plaintiffs' 
disputes have wound their way through the state and 
federal court systems. At every step, Plaintiffs have 
been given the ability to fully litigate their claims. As a 
result, Plaintiffs' allegations that they have been denied 
procedural due process are not plausible. 
As Plaintiffs have not shown a violation of their 
constitutional rights, let alone one that is clearly 
established, the individual Defendants are entitled to 
qualified immunity. 
D. CIVIL CONSPIRACY AND 
MISREPRESENTATION 
Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Guldner, Alta's Town 
Administrator, made false statements to owners of land 
in the Albion Basin Subdivision in 1993 concerning the 
availability of water to service the Albion Basin. Similarly, 
Plaintiffs complain of statements made by city attorneys 
to this Court. Finally, Plaintiffs take issue with the 
statements made by Defendant Niermeyer in his May 
23, 2011 letter. Plaintiffs allege that these various actions 
constitute civil conspiracy and misrepresentation. 67 
"To prove a civil conspiracy, plaintiff must show the 
following elements: (1) a combination of two or more 
persons, (2) an object to be accomplished, (3) a meeting 
of the minds on the object or course of action, ( 4) one or 
more unlawful, overt acts, and (5) damages as a proximate 
result thereof." 68 
To state a claim for fraudulent misrepresentation, 
Plaintiffs must allege: 
(1) that a representation was made 
(2) concerning a presently existing 
material fact (3) which was false 
and (4) which the representor either 
(a) knew to be false or (b) made 
recklessly, knowing that there was 
insufficient knowledge upon which 
to base such a representation, (5) for 
the purpose of inducing the other 
party to act upon it and (6) that the 
other party, acting reasonably and 
in ignorance of its falsity, (7) did in 
fact rely upon it (8) and was thereby 
induced to act (9) to that party's 
injury and damage. 69 
For substantially the same reasons stated above with 
regard to Plaintiffs' other claims, these claims too must 
fail. Simply stated, Plaintiffs can point to no unlawful 
acts or misrepresentations by Defendants. Further, these 
claims would be barred for various reasons under the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act. Therefore, these claims 
must be dismissed. 
E. ATIORNEY1S FEES 
*11 In adclition to seeking dismissal, Defendants Salt 
Lake City and the Town of Alta seek attorney fees 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927. However, Defendants do 
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not provide any discussion or analysis on this issue. While 
attorney fees may be warranted in this case, without 
-further analysis on this point, Defendants' request must be 
denied at this time. 
ORDERED that Defendants' Motions to Dismiss 
(Docket Nos. 26, 28, and 30) are GRANTED. Plaintiffs' 
Complaint is dismissed with prejudice. 
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Synopsis 
Background: Property owners brought action against city, 
alleging that city's continuing denial of water to property 
was unlawful based on several new or newly discovered 
facts. The United States District Court for the District 
of Utah, Ted Stewart, J., 2013 WL 968141, dismissed 
complaint. Property owners appealed. 
Holdings: The Court of Appeals, Gregory A. Phillips, 
Circuit Judge, held that: 
[1] owners' due process claims against city were precluded 
under doctrine of issue preclusion; 
[2] allegations against city failed to state equal protection 
claim; 
[3] owners' civil conspiracy claims against city and town 
were precluded under doctrine of claim preclusion; and 
[ 4] owners' allegations against city and town failed to state 
claim for fraudulent misrepresentation. 
Affirmed. 
Attorneys and Law Firms 
*623 Paul R. Haik, Krebsbach and Haik, Minneapolis, 
MN, for Plaintiff-Appellant. 
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* Before KELLY, HOLLOWAY and PHILLIPS, Circuit 
Judges. 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT ** 
GREGORY A. PHILLIPS, Circuit Judge. 
This appeal marks just one chapter in an ongoing saga 
over the municipal supply of water to property owned 
by Mark and Raymond Haik in Alta, Utah. In 1996, the 
Haiks sued the Town of Alta and Salt Lake City in an 
attempt to force either or both municipalities to extend 
water service to their lots. See Haik v. Town of Alta, No. 
97--4202, 1999 WL 190717, at *I (10th Cir. Apr. 5, 1999) 
[hereinafter Haik I]. The Haiks lost on summary judgment 
and we affirmed on appeal, concluding that the Haiks 
lacked an affirmative right. to water and that Alta and 
Salt Lake City had acted reasonably in refusing to supply 
it. See generally id Now the Haiks are before us again, 
appealing the district court's dismissal of their newest 
complaint, which alleges that Salt Lake City's continuing 
denial of water is unlawful based on several new or newly 
discovered facts. The issue is whether the Hailes' new 
allegations state plausible claims for relief in light of the 
preclusivc effect of Haile L They do not. 
FACTS 
1. Events Leading to Hai.k I 
In 1994, the Hailes purchased four undeveloped lots in 
the Albion Basin Subdivision, located at the top of the 
Little Cottonwood Canyon, east of Salt Lake City, Utah. 
The Hailes wanted to develop their lots but were unable 
to do so because of inadequate water supply. At the 
time, and apparently to this day, the Board. of Health 
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requires landowners to show an entitlement to 400 gallons 
of water per day to receive a building permit. When 
the *624 Hailes purchased their property, however, they 
succeeded to a right to just 50 gallons of water per day 
under a preexisting contract with the Little Cottonwood 
Water Company. No other water rights came with the 
property. 1 
The Haiks nonetheless believed they were entitled to more 
water because their lots fell within Alta's town limits. 
They contacted Alta to arrange for water service, but 
soon learned that Alta has no independent rights to 
the water at issue. Instead, Alta purchases Salt Lake 
City's surplus water according to an intergovernmental 
agreement from 1976 (Water Supply Agreement). The 
Water Supply Agreement grants Alta a good amount of 
water to do with as it pleases, but it restricts Alta's ability 
to extend water to properties outside then-existing town 
limits without first receiving the consent of Salt Lake City. 
The Albion Basin Subdivision falls outside the 1976 limits, 
thereby necessitating Salt Lake City's pre-approval for 
water service.Yet when the Haiks inquired, Salt Lake City 
declined to consent to the extension of water service to 
their lots. As a result, Alta denied the relevant building 
permits, leaving the Haiks high and dry. 
2. Haik I 
The Haiks sued Alta and Salt Lake City, asserting 
equal-protection claims against both municipalities. They 
further asserted an unconstitutional "taking" claim 
against Alta and alleged that Salt Lake City's refusal to 
consent under the Water Supply Agreement violated the 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. They also 
alleged that Alta had a municipal duty to provide water 
to the Albion Basin because Alta annexed the subdivision 
in 1981. 
The district court rejected the Haiks1 claims on summary 
judgment. The court found that Alta had no obligation to 
supply water to the Haiks because, even though Alta may 
have had the physical ability to supply water to the Albion 
Ba~in Subdivision, it lacked the legal ability to do so (at 
least unilaterally) under the Water Supply Agreement. Put 
another way, the only water truly "available" to Alta was 
that granted by Salt Lake City. 
Alta's annexation of the Albion Basin did not change this 
reality. Even though a municipality owes a general duty 
to supply water under the Utah Constitution, the district 
court observed that this duty "presupposes that the water 
to be supplied to inhabitants has already been lawfully 
acquired by the municipality." App. at 310. In this 
instance, Alta had not acquired the right to supply water 
outside its 1976 limits absent Salt Lake City's consent. 
Further, the court said there was no unconstitutional 
taking of the Haiks' property because the Haiks still bad 
in October of 1997 what they purchased in 1994: "lots 
in Albion Basin Subdivision # 1 with appurtenant water 
rights limited to 50 gallons per day per unit." App. at 316. 
The court similarly concluded that Salt Lake City's actions 
were justified. Nothing compelled Salt Lake City to 
consent to the supply of water beyond Alta's 1976 limits, 
and Salt Lake City had no legal duty to supply water to 
people outside its own city limits. Notably, the district 
court did not believe that the Ha_iks could even *625 
maintain an equal protection claim against Salt Lake City, 
because the city's actions were proprietary rather than 
administrative. 
The Haiks appealed the district court's dismissal of the 
equal-protection and taking claims. Haik I, 1999 WL 
190717, at *2. 
On appeal, we assumed the Hai.ks could maintain equal-
protection daims against both Alta and Salt Lake City 
but emphasized that the interest in water for real-estate 
development is not a fundamental right. Id at *3. As 
a result, Alta and Salt Lake City's actions were subject 
to rational-basis review, meaning they only needed to be 
"rationally related to a legitimate end." Id In our view, 
the actions of both municipalities satisfied this standard. 
Alta, for one, had good reason to deny water to the Haiks 
since the town would have violated the Water Supply 
Agreement had it extended water without Salt Lake City's 
consent. See id at *4. Salt Lake City, in tum, could 
refuse consent under the Water Supply Agreement given 
its legitimate interest in watershed preservation. See id 
The Hailes challenged Salt Lake City's stated preservation 
interest, citing examples of other people in the area who 
were receiving water. See id At the time, it was indeed true 
that Salt Lake City had consented to allow water to others 
outside Alta's 1976 limits. See id. In those cases, however, 
Salt Lake City had allowed water for snowmaking-one 
of the uses listed in a 1991 city ordinance governing 
new watershed permits, Ordinance 17.04.020. See id We 
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believed it was rational for Salt Lake City to determine 
that uses listed in Ordinance 17.04.020 would not result in 
significant harm to the watershed, whereas other new uses 
outside the 1976 limits might. Id. As for the examples of 
water use within Alta's 1976 limits, those did not require 
Salt Lake City's consent and, to the extent the Haiks 
challenged this feature of the Water Supply Agreement 
itself, we saw nothing wrong with Salt Lake City1s giving 
Alta carte blanche to supply water within the 1976 
limits but refusing to do so beyond. See id at * 5. The 
municipalities had to draw the line somewhere in light of 
their purported desire to curb harmful development. Id 
As for the Haiks' talcing claim against Alta, it failed on 
appeal for the same reasons announced by the district 
court. See id at *6-7. We too believed the Haiks retained 
the "full 'bundle' of property rights" they had originally 
purchased. See id 
3. The Haiks' Current Complaint 
In their current 115-page complaint, the Haiks allege 
several new or newly discovered facts: 
Approved Change Applications. According to the current 
complaint, Salt Lake City filed over a dozen applications 
in the early 1990s to get approval from the State Engineer 
to make certain changes in water use. The Haiks base 
their new allegations on Change Application al 6846 in 
particular, in which Salt Lake City sought to change the 
point of diversion and place ofuse forup to 15.75 acre-feet 
of water annually to serve the Albion Basin Subdivision. 
The Utah State Engineer approved the application in 
1997 while Haik I was still pending. The Haiks allege this 
resulted in two things: (1) Salt Lake City could provide 
more than 400 gallons of water per day to each of the 
Haiks' lots; and (2) the Albion Basin Subdivision became 
a part of Salt Lake City's water "service area." App. at 40, 
1 164; App. at 42-43, ,r 175. According to the complaint, 
however, neither Salt Lake City nor Alta mentioned these 
allegedly relevant facts during Haik I. Instead, the Haiks 
say that they learned about the approved change *626 
applications in 2007 after a neighbor came upon the 
records. 
Second Round of Permit Denials and Niermeyer Letter. 
Upon learning of the State Engineer's approval of Change 
Application a16846, the Haiks sought the necessary 
development permits for a second time. Salt Lake City 
and Alta authorities, including Alta Town Administrator 
John Guldner, denied them once again. For this, the Haiks 
partly blame Jeffry Niermeyer, the Director of Salt Lake 
City's Department of Public Utilities, who told permitting 
authorities that the Haiks were entitled to only 50 gallons 
of water per day under the Little Cottonwood contract. 
The Haiks claim this was a lie because, as Niermeyer knew, 
the Little Cottonwood contract had long been defunct. 
They allege that the real reason behind Niermeyer's letter 
was Salt Lake City's longstanding promise to Alta that city 
officials would use their "watershed management muscle" 
to help Alta stop development in the area. App. at 22,174. 
Water Bills to the Albion Basin Subdivision. The Haiks 
also allege that, since Haik I, they have discovered that 
Salt Lake City has been billing a number of homes in 
the Albion Basin Subdivision for water in unmetered 
amounts. The Haiks claim this shows that Salt Lake City 
is treating them differently from others within the Albion 
Basin Subdivision without reason. 
Salt Lake City's Approval of Water Supply to New Single-
Family Residences. The Hailes further allege that Salt Lake 
City has repeatedly consented to supply water to similarly 
situated people in the surrounding watershed canyons. 
Some of the Haiks' alleged examples of differential 
treatment predate Haik L and some do not. 
Current Claims. The Haiks seek to set aside the judgment 
in Haik I based on Salt Lake City and Alta's alleged 
concealment of the change applications. They also claim 
that Salt Lake City and Alta misrepresented to the district 
court in Haik I that no water was available to meet the 
domestic requirements of the Haiks1 lots. Additionally, the 
Haiks raise the following substantive claims: (1) violation 
of equal protection under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Salt 
Lake City; (2) violation of equal protection under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 against Jeffry Niermeyer (in his personal 
capacity); (3) violation of substantive due process under 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Salt Lake City; (4) violation of 
procedural due process under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Salt 
Lake City; (5) misrepresentation against Salt Lake City, 
Jeffry Niermeyer, Alta, and John Guldner; and (6) civil 
conspiracy against Salt Lake City and Alta. 
4. The District Court's Dismissal 
After considering the Hailes' new allegations, the district 
court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Haik v. 
Salt La.ke City Corp., No. 2:12--CV-997 TS, 2013 WL 
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968141, at *l (D.Utah Mar. 12, 2013). The Hai.ks' attempt 
to set aside the judgment in Haile I failed because the 
district court found that the alleged misconduct fell short 
of the high standard for relief under Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure 60(d)(l) and 60(d)(3). See id at *7-8. As for 
the Haiks' newly alleged claims, the district court believed 
that nothing of significance had changed since Haik I and 
that the majority of the Haiks' claims had already been 
decided. See id. at *7. Alternatively, the court concluded 
that the Hailes' allegations were implausible. See id at *8-
10. 
DISCUSSION 
On appeal, the Hailes argue that their new and improved 
allegations state plausible *627 claims for relief. We 
disagree. Nothing in the current complaint changes the 
legal landscape or position of the parties since Haik I or 
otherwise states a claim for relief. We discuss each of the 
Haiks' newly alleged claims in turn, leaving until last our 
discussion of their attempt to set aside the judgment in 
Haik I 
1. Standard of Review Under Rule 12(b)(6) 
We review de novo the dismissal of a complaint under 
Rule 12(b)(6). Diversey v. Schmidly, 738 F.3d 1196, 1199 
(10th Cir.2013). In doing so, we accept as true all well-
pleaded factual allegations. Schrock v. Wyeth, Inc., 727 
F.3d 1273, 1280 (10th Cir.2013) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). We then ask whether the complaint contains 
"enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on 
its face." Bell At/. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,570, 127 
S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). "A claim has facial 
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that 
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the 
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft 
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,678,129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 
868 (2009). 
1. Preclusion 
This case is unusual in that it follows a previous lawsuit 
involving several of the same parties, many similar 
allegations, and the same principal demand for relief. 
For this reason, we take a moment to discuss the twin 
doctrines of res judicata-claim preclusion and issue 
preclusion. "Under the doctrine of claim preclusion, a 
final judgment forecloses successive litigation of the very 
same claim, whether or not relitigation of the claim raises 
the same issues as the earlier suit." Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 
U.S. 880, 892, 128 S.Ct. 2161, 171 L.Ed.2d 155 (2008) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). "Issue preclusion, 
in contrast, bars successive litigation of an issue of fact 
or law actually litigated and resolved in a valid court 
determination essential to the prior judgment, even if 
the issue recurs in the context of a different claim." Id 
(internal quotation marks omitted). The doctrines serve 
the defendant's interest in avoiding repeat lawsuits as 
well as the court's interest in avoiding a waste of judicial 
resources. Arizona v. California, 530 U.S. 392, 412, 120 
S.Ct. 2304, 147 L.Ed.2d 374 (2000). The application ofres 
judicata is a pure question of law reviewed de novo. Pelt 
v. Utah, 539 F.3d 1271, 1280 (10th Cir.2008). 
Claim preclusion and issue preclusion are often difficult 
to apply in practice, and this case is no exception. The 
district court did not go too deep into the matter and 
simply concluded that the Haiks' rights and "the majority 
of the constitutional claims" had already been decided, 
without specifying which doctrine applied to what claims. 
App. at 280. On appeal, Appellees' arguments are similarly 
general. They argue that claim preclusion bars all of 
the current claims because the material facts have not 
changed since Haik L From their perspective, the Hailes' 
claims either have been decided or should have been raised 
before. 
[1] While we agree that the material facts from Haik I 
are unchanged, the preclusive effect of that judgment is 
more complicated. Even if the material facts are the same, 
the Haiks may still bring a lawsuit against Alta and Salt 
Lake City based on entirely new facts not part of the 
last cause of action. See Hatch v. Boulder Town Cowicil, 
471 F.3d 1142, 1150 (10th Cir.2006) ("[A] new action will 
be permitted only where it raises new and independent 
claims, not part of the previous transaction, based on 
the new facts." (emphasis in original)). Though many of 
the Haiks' *628 presently alleged facts are similar to 
those alleged before, we still believe at least some are new, 
and these new allegations are enough to make the Hailes' 
equal-protection and misrepresentation claims different 
for purposes of claim preclusion. The allegations still fail, 
but they fail under Rule 12(b)(6). The civil-conspiracy 
claim, however, is barred. 
As for the Haiks' due-process claims, we think issue 
preclusion is the more applicable doctrine. While 
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Appellees do not argue that issue preclusion applies on 
appeal, we are on notice of the issues we decided in 
Haik I and believe this is an appropriate circumstance 
in which to raise the doctrine sua sponte. See Arizona, 
530 U.S. at 412, 120 S.Ct. 2304 ("[I]f a court is on notice 
that it has previously decided the issue presented, the 
court may dismiss the action sua sponte, even though the 
defense has not been raised."). The Haiks have briefed the 
applicability of res judicata generally and have argued that 
the issues decided in Haik I are not identical to the issues 
here. 
3. The Due-Process Oaims Against 
Salt Lake City Are Barred by Haik I 
(2] Generally, to state either a procedural or substantive 
due-process claim, a plaintiff must first prove that the 
defendant's actions deprived the plaintiff of a protected 
property interest. Hyde Park Co. v. Santa Fe City Council, 
226 F.3d 1207, 1210 & n. 2 (10th Cir.2000). The Haiks did 
not raise due-process claims against Salt Lake City in Haik 
I, but they did raise a taking claim against the Town of 
Alta. See Haik I, 1999 WL 190717, at *6. In concluding 
that the Haiks could not maintain this claim, we reasoned 
that Alta's denial of a building permit did not deprive 
the Haiks of anything they had before; they "retain[ed] 
the full bundle of property rights they purchased." Id 
(internal quotation marks omitted). Furthermore, we said 
the "mere expectation of municipal water service in the 
future" is not "property subject to taking." Id. at *7. In 
short, the Haiks' taking claim failed "because they did not 
have a protectable interest in property." Id 
Issue preclusion "bars a party from relitigating an issue 
once it has suffered an adverse determination on the 
issue, even if the issue arises when the party is pursuing 
or defending against a different claim." 2 Moss v. Kopp, 
559 F.3d 1155, 1161 (10th Cir.2009). Here, the Haiks 
previously suffered an adverse determination on the very 
issue that is now critical to their due-process claims-that 
is, whether the denial of the development permits deprived 
them of a protected property interest. True, the Haiks 
previously argued that Alta deprived them of this interest 
by denying the permits, whereas now they allege that Salt 
La.ke City deprived them of their interest by interfering 
with the permitting process (by way of the Niermeyer 
letter). But this is a difference without a distinction. The 
very same question remains: Do the Haiks have any 
protected interest in the building permits, or, to put a finer 
point on it, in the water on which those permits depend? 
We said "no" before and are not inclined to *629 give the 
Haiks a second opportunity to litigate this issue. 
Nonetheless, the Haiks argue that our answer this time 
around should be "yes." After Haik I, they believe 
they acquired a protected property interest when the 
State Engineer-unbeknownst to them-approved the 
change applications identified in the complaint. The 
Haiks characterize this discovery as a change in "material 
operative fact." Appellants' Br. at 43. And they claim it is 
this new fact that gives rise to new issues not previously 
adjudicated. But because we disagree with the Haiks' 
premise, we must disagree with their conclusion as well. 
The change applications simply do not matter. 
To begin with, we reject the notion that a protected 
property interest arose with the mere approval of Change 
Application a16846 or any other change application. 3 
Under Utah law, a change application allows "a person 
entitled to the use of water" to seek permission to change 
"the point of diversion; place of use; or purpose of use for 
which the water was originally appropriated." Utah Code 
Ann. § 73-3-3(2)(a). "If an application is approved, the 
applicant may ... perfect the proposed application," id. § 
73-3-10(3)(c) (emphasis added), at which time the State 
Engineer issues a certificate of appropriation. Id § 73-
3-17. Nothing about this process requires the successful 
applicant to perfect or to use the water in the manner 
approved. So at most, the approved change applications 
"empowered" Salt Lake City to supply water to the Haiks' 
lots. See Searle v. Milburn Irrigation Co., 133 P .3d 382, 388 
(Utah 2006). But Salt Lake City already had this power in 
Haik I. As was the case then, we fail to see how the city's 
ability to supply water amounts to an obligation to do so 
-let alone a protected property interest belonging to the 
Haiks. 
Still, the Haiks allege that approved Change Application 
al6846 bad the particular effect in this case of bringing 
the Albion Basin Subdivision into Salt Lake City's service 
area, thereby requiring the city to extend its municipal 
water service to their lots. They believe that this triggered 
rights or interests belonging to them under Artic1e XI, 
Section 6 of the Utah Constitution as well as a duty on the 
part of Salt Lake City "to act reasonably in making water 
sales ... as a municipal function." App. at 20, 'ii 62. 
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Even assuming the lots are now within -the -city's service 
area, this fact doesn't entitle the Hailes to more water. To 
be sure, Article Xl, Section 6 of the Utah Constitution 
mandates that a municipality supply water owned by it to 
its inhabitants at reasonable charges. See Utah Const. art. 
XI,§ 6 ("[A]ll such waterworks, water rights and sources 
of water supply now owned or hereafter to be acquired by 
any municipal corporation, shall be preserved, maintained 
and operated by it for supplying its inhabitants with water 
at reasonable charges."); Platt v. Town of Torrey, 949 
P.2d 325, 328 (Utah 1997). But Article Xl, Section 6 says 
nothing of "others beyond the limits of the city," see Platt, 
949 P.2d at 330 (distinguishing municipal inhabitants 
from nonresidents), and just because the Haiks' lots now 
fall within Salt Lake City's service area, it does not follow 
that the Haiks are now Salt Lake *630 City inhabitants 
as well. See id. at 328 (discussing a town's obligations 
to "nonresident users within its services area" (emphasis 
added)). Indeed, time and again, the Hailes describe 
themselves as nonresidents of Salt Lake City. See, e.g., 
App. at 99-100, 1498; Appellants' Br. at 49. 
Consistent with the Utah Constitution, Utah courts do 
not impose a duty on municipalities like Salt Lake City 
to supply water to nonresidents like the Haiks. The 
Hailes actually appear to recognize as much. Again, 
they only allege that the city failed to exercise its 
discretion according to the "reasonableness requirement" 
articulated by the Utah Supreme Court in County Water 
System v. Salt Lake City, 3 Utah 2d 46, 278 P.2d 285 
(1954), and Platt v. Town of Torrey. App. at 54, ,r 237. 
(Complaint at ,i 320, 498.) But we are not persuaded 
that even this requirement applies. County Water System 
simply held that Salt Lake City's sale of surplus water 
outside city limits, like its sale of water within city 
limits, was not subject to regulation by the Public 
Service Commission. 278 P.2d at 290-91. There, the court 
recognized that the supplying of water to nonresidents 
was "as much a municipal function as the supplying of 
water within the city limits." Id. at 290. Platt, in turn, 
said that County Water System supported the rule that "a 
reasonable basis must exist for the disparate treatment of 
residents and nonresidents," specifically when it came to 
differing water rates. 949 P.2d at 328, 330. But both cases 
were concerned with the law only after a municipality 
elected to supply water to nonresidents. Neither case 
requires a municipality to have a reasonable basis for 
refusing to supply water to nonresidents in the first place. 
In fact, County Water System and Platt are consistent 
with what the district court said in Haik /-that a 
municipality's decision about whether to supply water to 
nonresidents is entirely permissive. See Cnty. Water Sys., 
278 P.2d at 290; see also Platt, 949 P.2d at 331 (citing 
favorably Schroeder v. City of Grayville, 166 Ill.App.3d 
814, 117 Ill.Dec. 681, 520 N.E.2d 1032, 1034 (1988) 
("[A]lthough not obligated to serve non-residents in the 
absence of a contractual relationship, a municipality is 
prohibited from discriminating unreasonably in rates or 
manner of service when it elects to serve non-residents.")); 
App. at 314 ("Salt Lake City has no legal duty to furnish 
water to users outside its own city limits, be they 'similarly 
situated' or not.") Utah's statutory law reinforces this 
permissive approach; it "authorizes municipalities to 
construct and operate 'waterworks' ... and to 'deliver the 
surplus product or service capacity of any such works, not 
required by the city or its inhabitants, to others beyond 
the limits of the city.' "Platt, 949 P.2d at 330 (emphases 
added) (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-14 (1996)). 
The purpose of allowing the municipal sale of excess 
water to people in adjacent areas is to avoid "shameful 
waste," see Cnty. Water Sys., 278 P.2d at 290, not to 
force municipalities to extend their water supply to every 
property owner living at the top of a far-flung canyon. 
Granted, we can imagine why the Haiks got their hopes 
up when they learned that Salt Lake City had sought 
out and received approval to supply water to the Albion 
Basin Subdivision in amounts allowing for development. 
In our view, however, the Haiks' hope of more water is still 
just that-a "mere expectation" that someone somewhere 
might one day supply water to their lots. Haik I, 1999 
WL 190717, at *7. The change applications did not alter 
anyone's obligations and they certainly did not give the 
Hailes a protected property interest or "legitimate claim of 
entitlement" to more water. Hyde Park Co., 226 F.3d at 
1210. 
*631 In sum, we see no reason to revisit our 
determination that the Haiks lack a constitutionally 
protected property interest in receiving water for their 
lots. 4 While affirming on this ground does not spare 
Salt Lake City the burdens it has already suffered in 
responding to this lawsuit, it does honor the preclusive 
effect of Haik I 
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4. The Equal-Protection Allegations Against 
Salt Lake City Fail to State a Oaiin 
In evaluating the sufficiency of their equal-protection 
allegations, the Hailes ask us to apply the two-step 
inquiry from Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 
562, 564, 120 S.Ct. 1073, 145 L.Ed.2d 1060 (2000). 
In that case, the Supreme Court held that the Equal 
Protection Clause gives rise to a cause of action even 
if a plaintiff does not belong to a particular class or 
group. See id To prevail, such a plaintiff must allege 
and prove (l) that she has been intentionally treated 
differently from others similarly situated and (2) that 
there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment. 
Id Because the Haiks do not allege class membership, 
we will proceed under this general framework. 5 But we 
proceed with caution, recognizing that class-of-one claims 
pose a danger of "turning even quotidian exercises of 
government discretion into constitutional causes." Kan. 
Penn Gaming, LLC v. Collins, 656 F.3d 1210, 1216 (10th 
Cir.2011). 
Of course, this is not the first time the Hailes have 
alleged equal-protection violations against Salt Lake City. 
In Haik L they claimed that Salt Lake City had acted 
unreasonably by refusing to supply water to them while 
choosing to supply water to others. See Haik L 1999 WL 
190717, at *3-4. The Hailes argue the same thing now, but 
this time they say Salt Lake City really has no good reason 
to continue to treat them differently. As before, the Haiks 
provide examples of other people who are receiving water 
while they go without. 
Appellees generally argue that the Haiks' equal-protection 
claim is barred because it is the same claim rejected 
on the merits in Haile I. We disagree. True; claim 
preclusion forecloses successive litigation of the "same 
claim." Taylor, 553 U.S. at 892,128 S.Ct. 2161. But claims 
are only the "same" for purposes of claim preclusion 
if they arise out of the same transaction or series of 
connected transactions. Yapp v. Excel Corp., 186 F.3d 
1222, 1227 (10th Cir.1999). In general, a transaction 
"connotes a natural grouping or common nucleus of 
operative facts." Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 
24 cmt. b, at 199 (1982). Under the transactional test, 
therefore, a new claim can go forward so long as it is based 
on new and independent facts not part of the previous 
transaction. Hatch, 471 F.3d at 1150. Here, the Hailes 
allege that Salt Lake City is unfairly supplying water to 
a number of new and different people in its watershed 
but that Salt Lake City (through Niermeyer) *632 sent 
a letter to permitting authorities in May 2011 reflecting 
the city's refusal to supply water to them. The Hailes also 
allege some comparators that predate Haik I, and we 
agree with Salt Lake City that the Haiks should have 
raised those examples before. Still, we think the new facts 
(arising subsequent to the prior action) "are enough on 
their own" to constitute a new claim. Id (quoting Storey 
v. Cello Holdings, LLC, 347 F.3d 370, 384 (2d Cir.2003)). 
Hypothetically at least, the Haiks' new allegations could 
make out an equal-protection violation where none had 
occurred before. 
(3} But the allegations are insufficient. Again, the 
first thing a class-of-one plaintiff must establish is that 
others "similarly situated in every material respect were 
treated differently." Kan. Penn Gaming, 656 F.3d at 1216 
( emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Depending on the case and the nature of the differential 
treatment, the allegations necessary to establish this level 
of similarity will vary. See Jennings v. City of Stillwater, 
383 F.3d 1199, 1214 (10th Cir.2004). The more variables 
involved in the government action at issue, the more 
specifics the plaintiff will need to allege to allow for 
meaningful comparison between the plaintiffs (negative) 
experience and the (positive) experiences of others. See 
id at 1215. Here, the complaint fails to allege with any 
specificity that the new water recipients are similar to the 
Haiks. 
The allegations of Salt Lake City's unmetered sale of 
water to "homes 6 in Albion Basin Subdivision" warrant 
separate discussion. App. at 19, 1 60. Certainly if the 
Haiks alleged that Salt Lake City was supplying water to 
their neighbors while denying water to them, they would 
be much closer to successfully alleging that Salt Lake 
City was treating them differently from others similarly 
situated. We're not sure if this is what the Haiks mean 
to allege since they also say that Salt Lake City treated 
them and several of their neighbors differently from 
others-le., the city treated people in the Albion Basin 
Subdivision the same way. Regardless, the problem here 
is that the Haiks do not allege that Salt Lake City denied 
them the water it is evidently supplying (or at least billing) 
their neighbors. Instead, the allegations are that Salt Lake 
City (through Jeffry Nienneyer) told authorities that the 
Haiks were only entitled to 50 gallons of water per day 
under the Little Cottonwood Water contract, resulting in 
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the denial of the Haiks' building permits. In the absence of 
allegations that Salt Lake City took a different approach 
with regard to other requests for development permits in 
the neighborhood, we have no way of assessing differential 
treatment. 
To some extent, this apples-to-oranges problem carries 
over to the other allegations of differential treatment as 
well. Have the Hailes even applied for the water permits/ 
approvals Salt Lake City has allegedly issued to the 
"similarly situated" comparators in the complaint? 
In sum, the Haiks have not alleged differential treatment 
that states a class-of-one equal-protection claim. We have 
little forgiveness for this since we expressly considered 
several things unique about the Hailes' situation in Haik 
/-including the location of their property, their desired 
use, and their limited contractual rights. The current 
complaint does not even attempt to allege facts that might 
lead us to *633 believe that the new water recipients are 
similar to them in any of these respects. 
5. The Civil-Conspiracy Oaiin Against Salt 
Lake City and Alta Is Barred by Haik I 
(4) Appellees argue that the Hailes' civil-conspiracy claim 
is barred by claim preclusion. We agree. The Haiks did not 
raise a state-law conspiracy claim in Haik I, but we believe 
that would have been the appropriate time to do so. 7 See 
Strickland v. City of Albuquerque, 130 F.3d 1408, 1413 
(10th Cir.1997) ("[Claim preclusion] bars claims that were 
or could have been brought in the prior proceeding."). 
The Hailes allege that Salt Lake City and Alta "combined 
to accomplish the objective of using denial of water as 
a means of controlling development within the Albion 
Basin Subdivision." App. at 120, 1 620. They describe 
this "policy" or "custom" of denying water service as 
longstanding. App. at 22-23, ,Mr 74, 76. Indeed, the Hailes 
trace the denials back to the early 1990s, when Salt Lake 
City allegedly promised the former mayor of Alta that 
it would deny water service to stop development in the 
area. They also allege that Salt Lake City and Alta's 
concealment of the change applications is an overt act of 
the conspiracy. 
We return to the transactional test. Again, it provides 
that "a claim arising out of the same transaction, or 
series of connected transactions as a previous suit, 
which concluded in a valid and final judgment, will be 
precluded." Yapp, 186 F.3d at 1227 (internal quotation 
marks omitted). We normally look to the initial complaint 
in determining the scope of the previous litigation and the 
"transactional nexus into which facts and claims are fitted 
or excluded for purposes of claim preclusion." Hatch, 471 
F.3d at 1150. Even though the complaint from Haik I is 
not a part of this record, we know a great deal about the 
first lawsuit from the decision of the district court and our 
own decision on appeal. Relevant here, we know the Haiks 
previously argued that Salt Lake City and Alta were joined 
in a "collusive desire to prevent any development in the 
upper Albion Basin." Haik I, 1999 WL 190717, at *2. And 
they claimed that Salt Lake City and Alta were working 
together to deny water to them for no good reason. 
It's clear that there is substantial overlap between these 
facts and the allegations supporting the Haiks' current 
civil-conspiracy claim. See Restatement (Second) of 
Judgments § 24 cmt. b, at 199 (1982) ("If there is a 
substantial overlap, the second action should ordinarily 
be held precluded.") As far as we can tell, the only new 
allegation (apart from ongoing conspiracy) is that Alta 
and Salt Lake City concealed the change applications. But 
this fact alone does not set forth a "new and independent" 
claim. 8 Hatch, 471 F.3d at 1150. Instead, we believe the 
Haiks' civil-conspiracy *634 claim arises out of the same 
transaction or series of transactions as Haik I and could 
have been raised as part of the "trial unit" in that case. 
Hatch, 471 F.3d at 1146; see Stone v. Dep't of Aviation, 453 
F.3d 1271, 1278 (10th Cir.2006) ("A plaintift's obligation 
to bring all related claims together in the same action 
arises under the common law rule of claim preclusion 
prohibiting the splitting of actions."). The claim was 
properly dismissed for this reason. 
Alternatively, we affirm the district court's dismissal under 
Rule 12(b)(6). In Haik L we found nothing suspicious 
or unlawful about the Water Supply Agreement or Salt 
Lake City and Alta's "purported objective ... to curtail 
further environmentally harmful development outside 
Alta's 1976 town boundaries." Haik L 1999 WL 190717, 
at *5. The same is true now, the Haiks' new allegations 
notwithstanding. 
6. The Misrepresentation Allegations Against Salt Lake 
City, Alta, Niermeyer, and Goldner Fail to State a Claim 
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(5) Fraudulent-and negligent-misrepresentation 
claims both require reasonable reliance on a 
misrepresentation of material fact. Olsen v. Univ. of Phx., 
244 P.3d 388, 390 (Utah Ct.App.2010). The Haiks allege 
that all Appellees are liable for misrepresentation due to 
their alleged lies and ongoing deceit about Salt Lake City's 
water supply. More specifically, they allege that Appellees 
led them to believe that Salt Lake City had no water 
and that there were no plans to service the area, when 
in fact both of those things were false-as shown by the 
approved change applications. We think these allegations 
are enough to give rise to a new and different claim 
for purposes of claim preclusion given that the Haiks 
didn't know about the change applications before. Still, 
the Haiks do not plead factual content that allows us to 
draw the reasonable inference that anyone is liable for 
misrepresentation. 9 
For one, we fail to see how a representation that Salt 
Lake City did not have water available to service the 
Albion Basin is false. The only argument the Haiks have 
on this score is that the approved change applications 
somehow gave Salt Lake City all the water it needed 
to service their lots. As discussed above, however, the 
change applications only authorized Salt Lake City to 
change the point of diversion and place of use of water it 
already had a right to use. True, the applications paved 
the way for Salt Lake City to supply water to the Albion 
Basin Subdivision. But they did not suddenly increase the 
amount of water available in general, nor did they make 
Salt Lake City's determination that there was not enough 
surplus water to extend to the Haiks' lots a lie. After all, 
Salt Lake City could decide there was no water "available" 
to service the Albion Basin Subdivision for a number of 
reasons, notwithstanding the city's physical or legal ability 
to extend service. 
We also find no reason to think it misleading for anyone 
to represent that Salt Lake City had no plans to service the 
*635 Albion Basin. From the beginning of this dispute, 
Alta has maintained that Salt Lake City controls water 
service to the Albion Basin Subdivision and Salt Lake City 
has maintained that it will not supply water to the Haiks' 
lots. 10 Both of those statements are entirely true and 
continue to be true to this day. That Salt Lake City now 
has the State Engineer's approval to supply to the Albion 
Basin Subdivision does not mean the city has plans to do 
so. Indeed, had Salt Lake City told the Hailes the opposite 
-that it did have plans to service the area-it seems that 
this would have been false. As this lawsuit proves, Salt 
Lake City has held firm to its longstanding representation 
that it will not extend water as the Haiks desire. 
If the Hailes had actually relied on Salt Lake City and 
Alta's representations, they would not have filed suit to 
compel the supply of water to their lots. This is their 
prerogative, but they cannot claim that they filed their 
lawsuits in reliance on anything Salt Lake City, Alta, or 
any of its officials said. They filed because they believed 
they were entitled to more water and that Salt Lake City 
and Alta were wrongfully refusing it. 
For these reasons, we believe the district court was correct 
in dismissing the Haiks' misrepresentation claims under 
Rule (12)(b)(6). 
7. Relief from Judgment in Haik I 
(6] The Haiks believe that their new allegations not only 
state claims for relief but that they are also enough to set 
aside the judgment in Haik I They allege that Salt Lake 
City and Alta committed fraud on the court by concealing 
the change applications and by dishonestly answering 
the district court's questions about water availability 
and plans for the Albion Basin Subdivision. 11 These 
allegations do not come close to the level of intentional 
fraud or gross injustice required to set aside a previous 
judgment. 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60 governs relief from 
final judgments and "does not limit a court's power to 
entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a 
judgment" or to "set aside a judgment for fraud on the 
court." Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(d). Parties seeking relief from a 
judgment through an independent action can do so only to 
"prevent a grave miscarriage of justice." United States v. 
Beggerly, 524 U.S. 38, 47, 118 S.Ct. 1862, 141 L.Ed.2d 32 
(1998). It is a "narrow. avenue" for equitable relief, United 
States v. Buck, 281 F.3d 1336, 1341 (10th Cir.2002), and 
can only be based on recognized grounds, such as fraud. 
Winfield Assocs., Inc. v. Stonecipher, 429 F.2d 1087, 1090 
(10th Cir.1970). Simi1arly, a judgment can be set aside for 
"fraud on the court" only in cases of "the most egregious 
misconduct, such as bribery of a judge or members of a 
jury, or the fabrication of evidence by a party in which an 
attorney is implicated." Buck, 281 F .3d at 1342 ( quoting 
*636 Weese v. Schukman, 98 F.3d 542, 552-53 (10th 
Cir .1996) ). We review the district court's denial of relief on 
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the ground of fraud upon the court for abuse of discretion. 
Id 
We have held that "nondisclosure to the court of facts 
allegedly pertinent to the matter before it[ ] will not 
ordinarily rise to the level of fraud on the court." Id The 
nondisclosure of the change applications is no exception. 
While the district court may have been curious about 
water availability and any plans for the area, the change 
applications were only marginally relevant to this inquiry 
at best. As we've stated, the change applications did not 
require Salt Lake City to supply water to the Hailes, nor 
did they necessarily reveal Salt Lake City's plans for the 
area. So, even if Salt Lake City's lawyer knew about the 
approved change applications, we hardly think he_ lied 
when he told the district court in Haik I that he thought 
it "would be very difficult for [the city] to ever consider" 
extending water service to the Albion Basin. 12 App. at 13, 
128. 
More importantly, the disclosure of the change 
applications would not have influenced the result in Haik 
I Like the district court, we determined that Alta and 
Salt Lake City could reasonably refuse water to the 
Haiks and that, at most, the Haiks could only claim a 
right to 50 gallons of water per day. Haik I, 1999 WL 
190717, at *l, *4. The parties agree that the approval of 
Change Application al6846 authorized Salt Lake City to 
use more water in the Albion Basin Subdivision. But we 
Footnotes 
never assumed that Salt Lake City lacked this authority 
before. 13 We just said that no one was required to 
extend water service to the Haiks' lots. Despite the Haiks' 
arguments to the contrary, this simple fact remains true 
today. 
In sum, this case is a far cry from those involving the 
kind of gross injustice that "demand[s] a departure from 
rigid adherence to the doctrine of res judicata." Beggerly, 
524 U.S. at 46, 118 S.Ct. 1862 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). We find no abuse of discretion. 
CONCLUSION 
After reviewing the Hailes' complaint and the exhibits 
attached to it, we conclude that none of their claims 
survives dismissal. Three of the five claims are precluded 
by Haik I, and the allegations are otherwise insufficient to 
state a claim under Twombly and Iqbal. We also conclude 
that the district court did not abuse its discretion in 
denying the Haiks1 relief from our previous judgment. We 
therefore affirm. 
The Haiks1 motion to certify is denied. 
All Citations 
567 Fed.Appx. 621 
* The late Honorable William J. Holloway, United States Senior Circuit Judge, participated as a panel member when this 
case was heard, but passed away before final disposition. 'The practice of this Court permits the remaining two panel 
judges, if in agreement, to act as a quorum in resolving the appeal." United States v. Wiles, 106 F.3d 1516, 1516 n. * 
(10th Cir.1997); see also 28 U.S.C. § 46(d) (noting circuit court may adopt procedures permitting disposition of an appeal 
where remaining quorum of panel agrees with the disposition). The remaining panel members have acted as a quorum 
** 
with respect to this order and judgment. 
This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of the case, claim preclusion, and 
issue preclusion. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 
32.1 and Tenth Circuit Rule 32.1. 
1 The Utah Supreme Court also reached this conclusion in a lawsuit brought by the previous owner of the Haiks' lots 
seeking to compel the issuance of building permits. See Melville v. Salt Lake Cnty., 570 P.2d 687,689 (Utah 1977) ("At 
most plaintiffs have proved that they may have a right to 50 gallons of water per unit constructed, which does not meet 
the County Board of Health's requirement of 400 gallons per unit per day."). As far as we know, the preclusive effect of 
2 
this judgment has never been argued. 
We have recognized four requirements of issue preclusion: 
(1) [T]he issue previously decided is identical with the one presented in the action in question, (2) the prior action 
has been finally adjudicated on the merits, (3) the party against whom the doctrine is invoked was a party, or in 
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3 
4 
5 
privity with a party, to the prior adjudication, and (4) the party against whom the doctrine is raised had a full and fair 
opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior action. 
Park Lake Res. Ltd. Liab. Co. v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 378 F .3d 1132, 1136 (10th Cir.2004 ). We discuss only the first 
requirement because the other three are obviously satisfied. 
We're not sure what the Haiks argue on this score. On the one hand, they contend that the State Engineer's approval 
triggered Salt Lake City's "duty to supply" water to their lots. Appellants' Br. at 32. In their complaint, however, the Haiks 
repeatedly allege that the approved change applications merely "authorized" Salt Lake City to supply water to the Albion 
Basin Subdivision. See, e.g., App. at 33, ,r 125; App. at 42-43, 1J 175; App. at 55, ,r 244. 
Because the Hai ks lack a protected property interest, we do not reach the separate question of whether they were afforded 
the appropriate level of process. See Brown v. Montoya, 662 F.3d 1152, 1167 (10th Cir.2011) ("[C]ourts must engage in a 
two-step inquiry: (1) did the individual possess a protected interest such that the due process protections were applicable; 
and, if so, then (2) was the individual afforded an appropriate level of process.") Accordingly, we need not evaluate the 
district court's conclusions on that score and we deny the Haiks' motion asking us to take judicial notice of proceedings 
before the Salt Lake Valley Board of Health. 
As in Haik I, "we assume ~or the purposes of this discussion only that the Haiks may maintain an equal protection claim 
against Salt Lake City." Haik I, 1999 WL 190717, at n. 2. 
6 We question the Hai ks' use of the word "homes" because there is no indication that anyone in the Albion Basin Subdivision 
has received the necessary permits to develop their "lots" -terminology the Hai ks switch to in their brief. 
7 The complaint appears to allege a civil-conspiracy claim under Utah law, although the Haiks attempt to recast this 
claim under section 1983. Like the district court, we don't believe the complaint gives fair notice of a section 1983 
conspiracy claim. Regardless, such a claim would also fail because the allegations do not set forth either a conspiracy or 
a constitutionally protected right. See Dixon v. City of Lawton, Oki., 898 F .2d 1443, 1449 (10th Cir.1990) ("[no recover 
under a§ 1983 conspiracy theory, a plaintiff must plead and prove not only a conspiracy, but also an actual deprivation 
8 
of rights .... "). 
'To prove a civil conspiracy, plaintiff must show the following elements: (1) a combination of two or more persons, (2) 
an object to be accomplished, (3) a meeting of the minds on the object or course of action; (4) one or more unlawful, 
overt acts, and (5) damages as a proximate result thereof." Israel Pagan Estate v. Cannon, 746 P.2d 785, 790 (Utah 
Ct.App.1987). 
9 "To state a claim for fraudulent misrepresentation, a plaintiff must allege ( 1) that a representation was made (2) concerning 
a presently existing material fact (3) which was false and (4) which the representor either (a) knew to be false or (b) 
made recklessly, knowing that there was insufficient knowledge upon which to base such a representation, (5) for the 
purpose of inducing the other party to act upon it and (6) that the other party, acting reasonably and in ignorance of its 
falsity, (7) did in fact rely upon it (8) and was thereby induced to act (9) to that party's injury and damage." State v. Apotex bl 
Corp., 282 P.3d 66, 80 (Utah 2012). 
10 Niermeyer's letter maintained this status quo. To the extent the Haiks allege that Niermeyer lied with he told permitting 
authorities that the Haiks had a right to 50 gallons per day under the allegedly defunct Little Cottonwood Contract, we fail 
11 
to see how this suggested overstatement of the Haiks' rights might support their misrepresentation claim. 
At one point in the complaint, the Haiks also allege that Salt Lake City failed to disclose its unmetered water sales to 
the Albion Basin Subdivision. To the extent this allegation is part of their claim for relief under Rule 60, we reject the 
significance of this alleged nondisclosure as well. As discussed, these water sales do not carry any weight in the equal-
protection context, and they do not indicate that Salt Lake City had a duty to supply water to the Haiks in the amounts 
they desire. 
12 We think it's entirely possible that the lawyer simply did not recall Change Application a 16846. According to the complaint, 
13 
it was filed about five years before the hearing at issue, along with a dozen other change applications. 
The district court in Haik I did not assume this either, but the Haiks cite the following statement from the court's order 
in suggesting otherwise: "The general duty imposed upon municipalities by Article XI, § 6 of the Utah Constitution ... 
presupposes that the water to be supplied to inhabitants has already been lawfully acquired by the municipality." App. at 
310 n. 13. The district court made this comment in discussing Alta's municipal obligations, not Salt Lake City's. Of course, 
the approveq change applications do not require Alta to supply water to the Haiks either. 
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